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Under the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, organ suppliers-usually
the famillies of critically injured accident victims-are not allowed to receive
compensation in exchange for granting permission to remove the organs of
their deceased relatives. This organ procurement regime is therefore driven
solely by potential donors' altruism. Due to the growing nationwide shortage
of transplantable organs, the altruistic system has begun to draw considerable
criticism. Focussing on the transplantation of kidneys, this Article challenges
the theoretical and economic underpinnings of the altruistic system by compar-
ing it to two alternative policies: a market system that allows demand and
supply to equilibrate at a positive price, and a system which transfers property
rights in cadaveric organs from potential donors to recipients. Blair and Kaser-
man subject these alternative policies to economic and ethical scrutiny, and
conclude that the market system would not only generate the largest number
of transplantable kidneys, but would also provide the greatest gain in overall
social welfare.
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Introduction
The National Organ Transplant Act of 19841 makes it a felony to buy or
sell human organs for the purpose of transplantation. The Act states: "It shall
be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive or otherwise transfer
any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation
if the transfer affects interstate commerce."2 Similar statutes complement this
legislation at the state level.3
This body of legislation does not create a new public policy toward organ
procurement, but rather serves to codify the de facto policy that has been in
1. National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507,98 Stat. 2339 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 273-274 (e)) (Supp. IV 1986).
2. Id. at § 274(e).
3. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1 - 289.1 (1985).
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place since organ transplants first became feasible in the late 1950s.' Specifi-
cally, the existing policy requires that organ acquisition occur at a price of zero.
Organ suppliers (who are generally the families of critically injured accident
victims) are not allowed to receive compensation in exchange for granting
permission to remove the organs of their deceased relatives. Their decision to
allow such removal under the existing system must therefore be based entirely
upon their altruistic desire to supply organs to unknown recipients in need of
transplant operations.5 Altruism is thus the motivating force behind organ
supply under the current system.6
This system of altruistic supply has consistently failed to yield an adequate
number of organs for transplantation. The number of organs donated annually
under this policy has fallen short of the number of organs desired by potential
transplant recipients for at least the past twenty years.7 In recent years this
chronic condition of undersupply has grown rapidly worse, and waiting lists
of potential organ recipients have lengthened correspondingly. Expected waiting
times are now measured in years rather than months, and many patients will
die because a suitable donor organ cannot be found in time.' The organ short-
age, which has persisted for so long, is rapidly growing worse and is now
approaching crisis proportions.
This glaring and egregious failure of the existing organ procurement policy
is currently spawning much-needed debate concerning alternative policy
options.9 In this paper, we examine three alternative policies for procuring
4. In fact, the Virginia statute, supra note 3, was passed in response to a physician's attempt to depart
from the traditional policy by creating a brokerage firm to buy and sell kidneys from living donors. See
Denise, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REv. 1015 (1985). The National Organ Transplant
Act itself makes no distinction between purchases from living donors and purchases of organs obtained from
deceased individuals.
5. Under the present system, the donor's family is provided very limited information about the recipient
(or recipients). The actual identity of the recipient is withheld to avoid potential problems of emotional or
even financial blackmail.
6. There are some amazing results under this system. For example, a California man died and made
life possible for six people due to the successful transplants of his heart, lungs, kidneys, liver, and pancreas.
Six Can Live With Man's Seven Organs, Gainesville Sun, Dec. 13, 1989, at 10A, col. 6. In another case,
a fire killed three young boys. In their time of grief, the boys' parents donated the boys' organs for
transplants. As a result, four people received a kidney, two people received a liver, and a woman received
a heart. Family Makes Loss A Gift of Lfe, Gainesville Sun, Dec. 27, 1989, at 3A, col. 3.
7. See Chapman, Retailing Human Organs Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 393, 399 (1983). See also, Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of
a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989); Dukeminier, Jr., Supplying Organs for Transplanta-
tion, 68 MICH. L. REv. 811 (1970).
8. In 1989, 1878 patients died while on official organ transplant waiting lists. Peters, Life or Death:
The Issue of Payment in Cadaveric Organ Donation, 265 J.A.M.A. 1302 (1991).
9. The literature relevant to this debate is large and rapidly growing. See, e.g., Barney & Reynolds,
An Economic Analysis of Transplant Organs, 17 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 12 (1989); Brams, Transplantable
Human Organs: Should Their Sale be Authorized by State Statutes? 3 Am. J. L. & MED. 183 (1977); Butler,
The Law of Human Organ Procurement. A Modest Proposal, 1 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 195
(1985); Chapman, supra note 7; Cohen, supra note 7; The Council of the Transplantation Society, Commerc-
ialisation in Transplantation: The Problems and Some Guidelines for Practice, 8457 LANCET 715 (1985);
Dukeminier & Sanders, Organ Transplantation: A Proposal for Routine Salvaging of Cadaver Organs, 279
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cadaveric organs for transplantation: (1) the current system of altruistic supply
at a zero price;'0 (2) a market system that allows demand and supply to equili-
brate at a positive price;" and (3) a system based on a redefinition of property
rights in cadaveric organs. 2 These three systems are the primary options
raised in discussions of alternative organ procurement policies. After describing
these three options, we critically examine both the economic and the ethical
arguments that have been raised concerning them.
In order to facilitate our discussion, we focus our attention on a single
organ: the kidney. This concentration on a single organ is necessary in order
to apply the basic economic concepts of supply and demand, upon which our
analysis depends. Because different organs cannot be substituted for one
another, one cannot legitimately draw a generalized demand curve for all
transplantable organs.
We chose to use the kidney as a model organ for two reasons. First, not
only was this the first organ to be transplanted successfully, but it is also the
organ for which the greatest demand for transplants currently exists. 3 And
second, virtually all organ collection activities currently revolve around kidney
procurements. The End Stage Renal Disease program of the Social Security
Administration currently funds all organ procurement agencies in the U.S., and
almost all cadaveric organs collected are located through these agencies. As a
result, donors of hearts, livers, lungs, etc. were generally kidney donors first. 4
Importantly, our focus on kidneys does not preclude extending our results to
other organs. With a few obvious modifications, our analysis applies directly
to other transplantable organs, and our conclusions are valid for these organs
NEW ENG. J. MED. 413 (1968); Freier, Organ Selling for Transplantation, 38 PROG. CLIN. & BIOL. RES.
141 (1978-79); Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, ORGAN TRANSPLAN-
TATION POLICY: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS (J. F. Blurstein & F. A. Sloan eds. 1989); Kaserman & Barnett,
An Economic Analysis of Transplant Organs: A Comment and Extension, ATLANTIC EcoN. J. (in press,
1991); Movrodes, The Morality of Selling Human Organs, 38 PROG. CLIN. & BIOL. RES. 133 (1978-79);
Rinehart, The Market Approach to Organ Shortages, 8 J. HEALTH CARE MKTO. 72 (1988); Schwindt &
Vining, Proposal for a Future Delivery Market for Transplant Organs, 11 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L.
483 (1986); Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft Act, 68
B.U.L. REv. 681 (1988); Steinbrook, Kidneys for Transplantation, 6 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 504
(1981).
10. See, e.g., Council of the Transplantation Society, supra note 9.
11. See, e.g., Brains, supra note 9; Cohen, supra note 7; Hansmann, supra note 9; Schwindt & Vining,
supra note 9.
12. See, e.g., Caplan, Organ Transplants: The Cost of Success, HASTINOS CTR. REP. (Dec. 1983);
Dukeminier & Sanders, supra note 9; Silver, supra note 9; Stuart, Veith, & Cranford, Brain Death Laws
and Patterns of Consent to Remove Organs for Transplantation from Cadavers in the United States and
28 other Countries, 31 TRANSPLANTATION 238 (1981).
13. Taylor, "Offering the Option": Organ Transplantation, 10 RENAL FAM. 27 (June 1988).
14. See Prottas, The Structure and Effectiveness of the U.S. Organ Procurement System, 22 INQUIRY
365, 366 (1985).
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as well.15 An analysis of kidney procurement represents a useful test case, the
conclusions from which can be applied to all transplantable organs.
We also limit our focus to cadaveric donorship or supply of organs. While
certain non-essential or reproducible body parts 6 may be provided by living
donors (e.g., a single kidney or bone marrow), the bulk of the vital organ
supply must ultimately come from cadavers. We therefore avoid some of the
more controversial issues associated with organ supply from living donors and
direct our attention to the policy options available for harvesting transplantable
organs from deceased individuals. 7
Our analysis reveals the clear superiority of a market-based system of organ
procurement over the two alternative policies on both efficiency and equity
grounds. Moreover, the analysis also suggests that the current system, which
depends on altruism, represents the worst choice from the set of policies
considered. Nonetheless, both physicians and hospital professional societies
defend the current system of altruistic supply and oppose the adoption of a
market system of cadaveric organ procurement. 18 The arguments made to
support this policy position are examined in detail and are found to be support-
able on neither logical nor empirical grounds.
I. The Kidney Shortage - Magnitude, Causes, and Consequences
Before examining the three policy options described above, we document
the current shortage of cadaveric kidneys for transplantation, briefly explain the
underlying causes of this growing shortage, and identify the major consequences
of a chronically inadequate supply of kidneys.
15. The most important differences between kidneys and most other transplantable organs are that
patients suffering from renal failure have an alternative treatment, dialysis, available to them, and that living
donors can be used to supply kidneys. These differences influence the shape and location of the demand
curve for kidneys relative to other organs, see infra Part II, but do not alter our analysis in any fundamental
way.
16. In a pathbreaking transplant at the University of Chicago, a mother gave part of her liver to her
22-month old daughter. A Mother's Gift ofLove and Life, NEWswEEK, Dec. 11, 1989, at 91. A young man
from Tennessee was a second living donor. Living Donor Says His Daughter's Doing Just Dandy, Gaines-
vilie Sun, Dec. 15, 1989, at 4A, col. 1.
17. To date, the only organ markets that have come into existence have involved living donors. The
obvious reason for this is the relative ease of arranging a transaction between a living donor and the
recipient. A market for cadaveric organs has never, to our knowledge, been organized.
18. The American Medical Association and the American Hospital Association oppose the formation
of organ markets and support the current system. See Schwindt & Vining, supra note 9, at 485. Also, the
American Society of Tranplant Surgeons, the American Society of Transplant Physicians, and the Interna-
tional Transplantation Society have adopted resolutions that allow for expulsion of any member who takes
part in a commercial organ market. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 24.
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A. Size of the Shortage
In the United States, the demand for kidneys for transplantation far exceeds
the supply. 9 As a result, a shortage exists or, alternatively, we may say that
there is excess demand. For most valuable assets for which a market exists, a
shortage cannot persist because the forces of supply and demand automatically
adjust to correct the imbalance.' ° These natural market forces are held in
check in the case of cadaveric kidneys, however, by the existing government
policy proscribing purchases and sales.
The current system's failure to provide a sufficient number of kidneys for
transplantation has become increasingly and painfully apparent in recent years.
Some authors have estimated that there are currently as many as 25,000 poten-
tial candidates for kidney transplants in the United States." Approximately
8,000 to 10,000 individuals are added each year to the list of patients needing
kidney transplants.22 While the number of kidney transplants performed has
risen from approximately 4,900 in 1981 to almost 9,000 in 1987, the number
of cadaveric kidneys donated leveled off in 1986 and has remained virtually
constant since then.' This relatively constant supply in the face of continually
increasing demand increases the annual shortfall and continually lengthens the
waiting list. 4 As this list grows, so do the expected waiting times and the
probability of failing to find a suitable organ within some given period.
B. Causes of the Increasing Shortage
While the current policy's reliance on altruistic supply is a fundamental
cause of the shortage of kidneys, three additional factors have contributed to
the growing excess demand for these organs. First, significant technological
advances have markedly improved the success rates of organ transplantation,
thereby shifting the demand for transplants and transplantable kidneys outward.
The principal discovery contributing to the improvement in transplant
19. The demand flow exceeds the supply flow each year, which yields a stock of patients who must
wait for donor kidneys to become available. As annual supply falls short of annual demand in each year,
this stock increases over time. Unfortunately, precise data on these annual flows are not available.
20. See, e.g., R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 69-70 (6th ed. 1981).
21. Aroesty & Rettig, The Cost Effects of Improved Kidney Transplantation, RAND REP. R-3099-
NIH/RC (1984); Schwindt & Vining, supra note 9.
22. Aroesty & Rettig, supra note 21.
23. Hull, U.S. Donor Procurement in 1989: Same Song, Third Verse, NEPHROLOGY NEWS & ISSUES
32 (March 1990).
24. See Interchangeable Parts, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 1988, at 61; Ruth, Wyszewianski, & Herline,
Kidney Transplantation: A Simulation Model for Examining Demand and Supply, 31 MGMT. Scm. 515
(1985). A symptom of excess demand is the continued reliance on living related donors in kidney trans-
plants. Despite the fact that introduction of the drug cyclosporine narrowed the difference between the
success rates of cadaveric and living related donor transplants, 20 to 30 percent of those waiting to receive
kidney transplants continue to rely upon living related donors. This is largely because of delays involved
in obtaining a well-matched cadaveric kidney. See Hull, supra note 23.
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technology has been cyclosporine, an immunosuppressive drug that substantially
reduces the risk of rejection of the transplanted organ.' This drug was intro-
duced in the United States in 1979 and has been successfully applied to, among
others, kidney, heart, and liver transplants. 26 The current overall success rates
for transplants of these three organs are 85 percent, 80 percent, and 50-70
percent respectively,27 which compare quite favorably to the precyclosporine
success rates of approximately 70 percent for kidneys, 58 percent for hearts,
and 25 percent for livers.'
Second, a 1972 amendment to the Social Security Act authorizes the federal
government to pay 80 percent of the cost of treatment (dialysis or transplanta-
tion) of all persons suffering from kidney failure.29 The End Stage Renal
Disease program, which is operated under Medicare, grew from $228.5 million
in 1974 to almost $2 billion in 1982.10 In addition, private insurance coverage
has gradually expanded to include some heart and liver transplants as these
procedures have become increasingly commonplace. These increases in funding
and coverage have further stimulated the growth in transplant demand.
Third, after years of continual growth at approximately ten percent per year,
cadaveric kidney donations abruptly leveled off in 1986 and have remained
essentially steady since that time.3' Since kidney donors are the principal
source of other organ donations, this unanticipated restriction in the growth of
kidney supply is expected to reduce the growth of heart and liver supply as
well. 32 The cause of this sudden change in the trend in organ donation is
subject to considerable debate at present, but no one has yet provided a defini-
tive answer. Moreover, this reversal has occurred despite an increase in federal
funding of organ procurement under the National Organ Transplant Act of
1984.33
The increasingly inadequate supply of transplantable kidneys exists despite
the expenditure of several hundred million dollars annually by the Health Care
Financing Administration on organ procurement efforts. 34 The present system
is operated by some seventy to eighty organ procurement agencies located
25. See Chapman, The Ldfe.and-Death Question of an Organ Market, FORTUNE, June 11, 1984, at 108;
Denise, supra note 4.
26. Another new drug, still known by its code name, FK-506, offers even greater promise than cyclospor-
inc. See Great Success With Drug in Transplants of Organs, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
27. These are one-year patient survival rates.
28. Kahan, Organ Transplantation: Hearings on S.541-27 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 177, 179 (1983); The Impact of Cyclosporine on the Practice of
Renal Transplantation, 21 TRANSPLANT. PROC. 63 (1989).
29. See Chapman, supra note 7; Prottas, supra note 14.
30. Aroesty & Rettig, supra note 21.
31. Hull, supra note 23.
32. See Prottas, Structure and Effectiveness, supra note 14, at 366; Prottas, The Organization of Organ
Procurement, in TRANSLPLANTATION POLICY: IssuEs AND PROsPECTs 44 (Blumstein & Sloan eds. 1988).
33. See Cohen, supra note 7.
34. Interview with Dr. P. Eggers, a policy analyst, Health Care Financing Administration, Mar. 18,
1989
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throughout the United States." Moreover, the shortfall in supply persists
despite the fact that the number of potential donors annually exceeds the
number of organs needed. It has been estimated that between 17,000 and 26,000
people die annually under circumstances that would permit organ donation.36
Theoretically, then, a minimum of approximately 34,000 kidneys could be
collected, and as many as 52,000 kidneys may be obtainable annually. In each
year from 1986 through 1988, however, only around 7,000 cadaveric kidneys
were transplanted. 37 Thus, only 13 to 20 percent of potential donations result
in usable harvested kidneys. Moreover, the wastage rate for kidneys is approxi-
mately 12 percent, and a "matched" recipient is found for virtually all usable
kidneys.38 In sum, the current organ shortage results from an insufficient rate
of donation under the altruistic policy.
The low donation rate of kidneys appears to be due more to a failure to ask
potential donors to donate than to outright refusals to donate. 39 The prospect
of approaching a grieving family with a request to remove the organs of the
recently deceased is uninviting; and, under the present system, no one has a
financial incentive to undertake this unpleasant chore. Consequently, it
frequently remains undone.
The organ shortage we are experiencing is not mandated by nature, but is the
outcome of a failed public policy that provides insufficient incentives for
cadaveric organ donation to occur.
C. Consequences of the Shortage
The shortage of kidneys for transplantation imposes substantial costs on
society. These costs stem from a variety of sources. First, since hearts, livers,
and other cadaveric organs are generally obtained from efforts to encourage
kidney donation, any reduction or shortfall in collection rates for kidneys
translates into an equivalent decrease in donations of these other organs.
Shortages of these vital organs for transplantation often lead, in turn, to the
deaths of patients awaiting such organs. At present, there are thousands of
patients who die each year due to the lack of a suitable donor organ.4 A
35. See Prottas, Structure and Effectiveness, supra note 14.
36. Prottas, Organization of Organ Procurement, supra note 32, at 48. Generally, to donate one's
organs, death must occur in a hospital environment with the relevant organs functioning properly. Also,
the patient must be within a certain age range and must be free of any serious infections (e.g., pneumonia).
See Steinbrook, Kidneys For Transplantation, 6 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 504 (1981).
37. Hull, supra note 23, at 34.
38. See Prottas, Organization of Organ Procurement, supra note 32, at 49. Wastage results from
improper removal or handling of the kidneys or from inferior quality of the organ discovered upon removal.
39. A 1985 Gallup poll found that 73 percent of respondents would be willing to donate the organs
of a recently deceased relative. See Developments in the Law: Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1519, 1621 (1990).
40. Peters, supra note 8, at 1302.
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substantial increase in the collection rates for kidneys would save many of these
lives.
Second, as a direct consequence of the kidney shortage, approximately
110,000 renal patients remain on dialysis in order to sustain life while waiting
for a cadaveric kidney to become available for transplantation.4 Of these
patients, estimates indicate that approximately one half could benefit from a
kidney transplant.42 There are two major social costs associated with maintain-
ing these patients on dialysis. First, dialysis is a more expensive treatment than
transplantation. Research indicates that a successful kidney transplant saves as
much as $60,000 per patient over a five-year period compared to dialysis costs
over the same period.43 As noted above, these costs are paid by the Health
Care Financing Administration under the End Stage Renal Disease program.
Thus, if the entire waiting list of 25,000 renal patients could be transplanted,
this program would reduce costs by approximately $150 million over a five-
year period. These savings would double if all renal patients who would benefit
from a kidney transplant received a successful donor organ. The inability to
achieve this cost reduction is directly attributable to the shortage of kidneys for
transplantation created by the current procurement system.
Furthermore, although dialysis is capable of sustaining a renal patient's life
indefinitely, it is far from a perfect substitute for a successful kidney transplant.
Patients on dialysis must spend a considerable amount of time connected to the
dialysis machine." Moreover, many (or most) of these patients experience
energy loss, nausea, weakness, hypertension, bone disease, infections, athero-
sclerotic disease, and other problems from the treatment itself. As a result,
many (or most) of these patients are unable to work and experience substantial
reductions in income and their overall quality of life.45 While these costs do
not appear on any formal ledger, they are, nonetheless, very real.
A third major consequence, a clear symptom of the chronic shortage of
cadaveric kidneys is the use of living donors. Between 20 and 30 percent of
all kidney transplants performed in the U.S. use living donors. ' 6 Although
41. Cohen, supra note 7, at 4.
42. Prottas, Structure and Effectiveness, supra note 14, at 366.
43. Aroesty & Rettig, supra note 21, at 27. More recently, it has been estimated that annual savings
could reach $25,000 per patient. Heart Transplants: The Beat Has Picked Up, Bus. WK., Aug. 28, 1989,
at 94.
44. There are two basic forms of dialysis - hemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis. The former is used
far more often. The problems we identify in the text apply to both hemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis.
With hemodialysis, the patient must spend two to four hours a day, three days a week connected to the
machine. In addition, when disconnected, patients usually experience a "washed out" feeling for the rest
of the day.
45. See Merrill, Dialysis Versus Transplantation in the Treatment of End-Stage Renal Disease, 29 ANN.
REV. MED. 343 (1978). Perhaps the best indication of the reduced quality of life on dialysis is the fact that
the rate of suicides among these patients is over 100 times that of the general population. Cohen, supra note
7, at 38.
46. See Hull, supra note 23.
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long-term success rates are slightly higher with living donors, the marginal
improvement in results is rapidly declining as new immunosuppressive drugs
are discovered and, even now, the added costs associated with living donor
transplants are unjustifiable. Such transplants place the donor (who is generally
a relatively young and healthy individual) at a slight risk of subsequent renal
problems or even death.47 With much greater certainty, however, the operation
required to remove the donated kidney (the nephrectomy) is painful and
requires a substantial recovery period - as much as four weeks in the hospital
with several more weeks (or even months) of restricted activity. Thus, the
donor's lost time from work and his or her own unnecessary pain and suffering
add to the costs of the current shortage situation.
We do not dispute that these costs yield substantial social benefits in terms
of the recipient's health and productivity. But given the more than adequate
supply of cadaveric kidneys that nature (or highway accidents) provides, they
are unnecessary. An improved cadaveric organ procurement policy could
obviate the need for living donors.
The current severe shortage of cadaveric kidneys is likely to grow worse
in the coming years as demand continues to increase while supply remains
stagnant. Moreover, the social costs imposed by this shortage are substantial
by any measure. As a result, it has become imperative that alternative public
policies be examined seriously. In the following sections, we describe the three
principal alternative systems of organ procurement and analyze their economic
and ethical implications.
II. The Current System: Altruism
We will argue that the organ procurement problem is primarily an economic
problem with both medical and ethical ramifications. Economic analysts
addressing this subject quite naturally refer to the supply and demand for
organs, and describe the chronic shortage of organs as a case where the latter
exceeds the former at the existing price. In comparing alternative organ procure-
ment policies, we will make extensive use of these fundamental economic
concepts.
Our use of the traditional tools of economic analysis enables us to make
explicit analytical statements about alternative organ procurement systems. At
the most fundamental level, these systems vary only in (a) the price at which
the organ exchange takes place (zero or positive), and (b) the assignment of
property rights in the transplantable organ (which, in turn, determines which
47. As of 1985, at least sixteen individuals have died while donating a kidney. Denise, supra note 4,
at 1033. This translates into a death rate from kidney donation of approximately one in 10,000. Having a
nephrectomy increases long-term risk by about the same amount as driving a car an extra fifteen miles a
day. Freier, supra note 9, at 143.
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party will receive payment in those systems permitting such payment). The use
of supply and demand analysis will therefore allow us to highlight the basic
differences between these systems in terms of how many transplantable kidneys
each may be expected to provide. This permits us to address the issue of
resource allocation directly and to explore the overall social welfare implica-
tions of alternative policy options.
The principal limitation of these analytic concepts is that presently we do
not have reliable empirical information .regarding the precise shape and location
of the supply curve of cadaveric kidneys. As a result, we will be forced to
speculate somewhat concerning the location of this curve. Nonetheless, we are
able to draw certain broad inferences about cadaveric kidney supply from
simple economic reasoning and prior information, and the major conclusions
we shall draw remain valid over a relatively wide variation in the precise shape
and location of this curve.
A. Kidney Demand
In Figure 1, we introduce the kidney demand curve. Here, we measure the
price of kidneys on the vertical axis and the quantity of kidneys on the horizon-
tal axis. The demand function is depicted as a straight line with a negative
slope, although linearity of this function is not required for our analysis to hold
(i.e., the demand curve need not be a straight line).
Several observations about the demand curve are in order. First, the demand
for kidneys is essentially a demand for an input, as opposed to a demand for
some output. Consumers do not wish to acquire kidneys for direct consumption.
If kidneys were not employed as an input in the production of transplant
operations, there would be no demand for these organs. Demands for inputs
are referred to as derived demands, because they are derived from the demands
for the outputs they are used to produce. In the case of kidneys, demand is
derived from the demand for transplant operations which, in turn, is derived
from the demand for health.
Moreover, each transplant operation requires exactly one transplantable
kidney. There are no other inputs that may be substituted for the kidney in the
production of the transplant operation. This one-to-one ratio between the kidney
input and the operation output simplifies the derivation of kidney demand from
the demand curve for kidney transplant operations. Specifically, the price a
person is willing to pay for a transplantable kidney is equal to the price he or
she is willing to pay for a completed transplant operation minus the cost of the
surgery and hospital care required to put the new kidney in place.41
48. Graphically, the derived demand curve for kidneys will equal the demand curve for transplant
operations shifted downward (vertically) by the marginal cost of the operation. See R. BLAIR & D.
KASERMAN, ANTrrRUST EcoNoMics 295-98 (1985).
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at Q2 Quantity of Kidneys
Figure 1
Second, it is very likely that the demand curve for transplantable kidneys
is extremely steep over a wide price range. In economic terms, kidney demand
is relatively price inelastic, 49 which means that the number of kidneys
demanded for transplantation is unlikely to be substantially influenced by the
price of kidneys over this range. In fact, it is quite possible that, over the price
range relevant to our analysis (from zero up to the market equilibrium price),
the demand curve for kidneys is completely vertical, as depicted in Figure 2.
When changes in the price of kidneys have no discernable effect on the quantity
of kidneys demanded, as in Figure 2, we say that the demand curve is perfectly
inelastic.
This insensitivity of the quantity of kidneys demanded to price changes is
due to two considerations. First, while a substitute treatment is available
(dialysis), it is a much less attractive alternative. Patients for whom transplanta-
tion is a feasible alternative tend to opt for this form of treatment over dialysis
due to the higher costs of dialysis in terms of both time and health. Second,
since eighty percent of the costs of virtually all kidney transplants are covered
under the End Stage Renal Disease program, renal patients are not required to
bear the full financial burden of the transplant operation10 Consequently, the
demand for transplant operations is extremely price inelastic; and, since the
49. On this point, there appears to be no disagreement. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 7, at 31. As price
elasticity increases the slope of the demand curve falls, i.e., it becomes flatter.
50. The federal government, through the End Stage Renal Disease Program, paid for 7073 of the total
7695 kidney transplants performed in 1985. Developments in the Law, supra note 39, at 1631.
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demand for kidneys is derived from the demand for transplants, it, too, is likely
to be highly price inelastic over a substantial range.
Third, it is difficult to know with certainty the actual number of kidneys
demanded at the current price of zero. As a consequence of the shortage of
transplantable kidneys, physicians and organ procurement officials prevent
certain individuals from joining waiting lists if they feel that these individuals
would not be good candidates for a transplant for either medical or behavioral
reasons. As a result, some, and perhaps many, patients who might benefit from
a kidney transplant never appear on official waiting lists. Thus, the current
quantity demanded may be much greater than the number of people on these
lists would suggest.
B. The Shortage, Current Value, and Black Market Activities
Under the current system, the potential donor or potential donor's family
holds the property right in the organ or organs.5' As noted above, the current
organ procurement system is driven by the National Organ Transplant Act of
1984, which makes it illegal to pay for organs to be used in transplants. Thus,
public policy relies exclusively on altruism to generate the supply of much
51. In practice, the property rights in this area are ill-defined. See generally Schwindt & Vining, supra
note 9. As these authors point out, problems invariably arise when a valuable asset exists without well-
defined property rights. Clearly, this ambiguity of ownership is a major flaw of public policy in the organ
procurement area.
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needed organs. 2 The problem this policy creates is illustrated in Figure 1. At
a zero price, we observe that the quantity supplied is QI while the quantity
demanded is Q2. The shortfall in supply, or excess demand, is given by the
difference between Q2 and Q1.This difference represents the number of people
who would like to receive a cadaveric kidney transplant but are unable to do
so because of the absence of a donor.
The altruistic system of kidney procurement provides little information on
the prices that would prevail under a market system. In Figure 1, we see that,
at the current level of supply, there are people willing to pay P, for a kidney.
This price reflects the value that these people place on having a kidney for a
transplant. But this relatively high value flows from the restricted quantity
supplied at the mandated price of zero. Under the shortage conditions that exist,
certain individuals are willing to pay extraordinarily high prices for the rationed
good.
In the United States, individuals have placed advertisements in newspapers
indicating a willingness to sell one of their kidneys (live) for $10,000 to
$50,000.: And in Germany, at least one firm has begun to broker kidneys
from living donors, offering as much as $45,000 per kidney.54 This indicates
a perception on the part of these individuals that this is what a kidney is
currently "worth" on the open market. Some commentators have assumed
implicitly that similar prices would prevail under alternative (non-altruistic)
procurement systems. For reasons that will become clear below, however, we
seriously doubt that this is the case.
There is a very disturbing consequence of any system that creates an
imbalance between supply and demand. The artificial value created by restrict-
ing the price of a valuable commodity to zero, and thereby encouraging an
undersupply, invariably gives rise to various forms of black market activity.
A relevant example is the well-known incidence of bribery in the adoption of
children.55 Although documentation is not currently available, it appears that
similar, or even more serious, behavior has been exhibited by patients attempt-
ing to obtain needed organs. For example, wealthy individuals have reportedly
been moved to the top of organ waiting lists after making substantial "dona-
tions" to transplant centers.56 And abroad, the World Health Organization is
52. For a more extensive treatment of the existing public policy, see Blumstein, Government's Role
in Organ Transplantation Policy, 14 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 5 (1989).
53. Chapman, supra note 25, at 114. In addition, an Australian woman offered to sell one of her
kidneys for $20,000. Kidney Sales Spur Attempt in Britain to Ban the Practice, Wall St. J., July 10, 1989,
at A5, col. 2.
54. Kidneys for Sale: The Issue is Tissue, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 5, 1988, at 38.
55. See generally, Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STuD. 323
(1977).
56. This is but one of the abuses reported in a six-part series on kidney transplantation in the Pittsburgh
Press, Nov. 3-10, 1985. See also Manga, A Commercial Market For Organs? Why Not?, I BIOETHICS 321
(1987).
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encouraging member countries to outlaw organ sales. This action was taken,
in part, in response to undocumented reports that children from Brazil and
Honduras were being sold to organ and tissue traders in other countries who
were converting them into "organ farms. '57 Thus, the current policy which
prohibits white market trade at positive prices creates strong economic incen-
tives for black market trade at artificially inflated prices.58
C. Why the Current System Has Endured
Despite the fact that the current system has consistently failed to produce
a sufficient supply of cadaveric organs, it has endured for well over 20 years
now.59 To what may we attribute this policy's longevity? While we cannot
answer this question completely, we can offer several partial explanations.
Like any public policy, the current altruistic system of cadaveric organ
procurement, regardless of its overall performance, yields direct benefits to
certain groups. In the case of kidney procurement, three such groups readily
come to mind. First, those parties involved in the treatment of end stage renal
disease by either dialysis or transplantation stand to profit from the restricted
quantity of organs supplied under the current altruistic system. For owners of
dialysis clinics, many of whom are physicians, the organ shortage that is created
by forcing price to remain at zero causes a higher level of demand than would
exist under a system of procurement that produced a sufficient number of
kidneys. That higher demand, in turn, increases the profitability of dialysis
treatment centers.
Furthermore, the high rate of entry by for-profit dialysis centers suggests
that these profits are quite large. The number of for-profit providers of dialysis
has increased by more than 150% since 1980 (Table 1 provides more detailed
renal provider statistics). Since firms will not generally enter an industry unless
that industry is earning above-normal profits, these entry data strongly suggest
that the dialysis business has been relatively profitable over the decade of the
1980's. Such profitability is at least partially due to the rising demand for
dialysis which, in turn, is at least partially due to the shortage of transplanted
kidneys.
57. See Chengappa, The Organs Bazaar, INDIA TODAY, July 31, 1990, at 33. Of course, the idea that
one can reduce or eliminate black market activities by proscribing white market sales is disingenuous at
best.
58. Excess demand also permits various sorts of discriminatory behavior. For instance, some commenta-
tors allege that blacks must wait longer for a kidney transplant than whites. Blacks On List Longer For
Kidney Transplants, Gainesville Sun, Aug. 23, 1990, at 5A, col. 1.
59. See Chapman, supra note 7, at 399.
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Table I
MEDICARE RENAL PROVIDER STATISTICS
(by Calendar Year)
Calendar Total Total Hospital Independent Transplant For-Profit Approved
Year Providers Hospital Dialysis Providers Providers Providers Outpatient
Based Providers Stations
Providers
12/80 1,054 649 636 405 151 343 12,329
12/81 1,162 676 657 486 157 408 13,784
12/82 1,218 690 642 528 159 437 14,438
12/83 1,308 682 629 627 159 504 15,506
12/84 1,368 700 622 668 170 544 16,594
12/85 1,463 715 632 748 178 616 17,845
12/86 1,578 717 639 861 184 715 19,383
12/87 1,701 741 660 960 199 805 21,246
12/88 1,819 753 668 1,066 202 907 22,605
The potential benefit of restricting organ supply is perhaps less obvious for
transplant centers. Nonetheless, it is relatively easy to show that by restricting
the supply of an essential input, the quantity of output is similarly restricted,
and the potential profits of the industry are thereby increased.' Transplant
surgeons and hospitals could increase profits by restricting total industry output
below the competitive level. In order to hold supply to this level, however, it
would be necessary for them to form a cartel that would set price at or near
the monopoly level and establish quotas on the number of operations each
center could perform so that the total industry output would be held below the
competitive level. Such a cartel, however, would face the perennial problems
60. For a graphic proof of this statement, see Kaserman & Barnett, An Economic Analysis of Transplant
Organs: A Comment and Extension, ATLANTIC ECON. J. (forthcoming 1991).
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encountered by all such arrangements - entry and cheating.6 The excess
profits that exist at the restricted cartel output attract new producers into the
industry and create strong incentives for individual cartel members (transplant
centers) to expand production beyond the authorized amount.
Such output-expanding activities are effectively prevented by restricting the
number of transplantable organs available. By forcing a zero price on organs,
the quantity of organs supplied is artificially restricted to Q, in Figure 1,
thereby restricting the number of transplant operations. Thus it appears that
adopting an organ procurement policy that relies upon altruism for supply holds
output below the competitive level, thereby providing an effective cartel
enforcement mechanism, which in turn increases profits above the competitive
level.
To evaluate the success of this policy in maintaining profits at above-normal
levels at the transplant stage of production, we again examine entry information.
Table I indicates a 34 percent increase in the number of transplant providers
over the 1980-88 period. More recently, an article in the Wall Street Journal
reported that "[h]ealth-care experts fear an explosion in the number of trans-
plant facilities. '62 This article went on to describe the increase in the number
of hospitals doing heart transplants from less than 20 in 1983 to 141 in 1988
(over a 600 percent increase in six years). Again, such entry would not occur
unless the transplant business were quite profitable.63
Given this situation, we conclude that physician and hospital support for
the current altruistic system of organ procurement may be due, at least in part,
to the enhanced profitability created by this policy. Furthermore, there is an
additional incentive for physicians and hospitals to continue to defend the
current system, one which is more political in nature. Specifically, these health
care professionals may not want third parties, such as private organ procurement
firms, inserting themselves between physicians and patients (or patients'
families) in the organ acquisition process. In other words, their support for the
current system could simply represent a desire to protect their "turf." Such a
political motive would, of course, buttress the economic incentives described
above.
Health insurance companies that cover transplant operations comprise a
second group that stands to benefit from the current organ shortage (and that
61. In addition, of course, such cartel agreements are illegal in the United States. See Blair &
Kaserman, supra note 48, at 153-77.
62. See Winslow, Hospitals Rush to Transplant Organs, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1989, at BI, Col. 3.
63. See id. (pointing out that this rapid entry into the transplant business is creating an inefficient
industry structure as a relatively fixed number of organs are spread over an increasing number of transplant
centers). The result is a large number of centers doing a very small number of transplants each year. For
example, thirty-seven percent of all kidney transplant centers performed fewer than fifteen operations in
1988. Id. If the production of transplant operations is subject to any economies of scale, entry in the face
of a relatively fixed number of organs will increase industry costs.
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could therefore be expected to defend the altruistic system of supply). 64
Restricting the supply of organs constrains the number of transplant operations,
thereby reducing the claims experienced by these firms.
Third, parties such as existing organ procurement agencies, organ procure-
ment officers, and those employed in quasi-governmental organizations involved
in allocating the limited supply of organs among desperately waiting patients
(e.g., the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS)), also benefit from the
existing system as many of their jobs are directly dependent upon the shortage
situation created by this system.
Finally, an additional reason for the longevity of the existing policy involves
the severity of the shortage it has created. While analysts have been deploring
this shortage for over twenty years,6 5 it is only within the past several years
that the number of deaths due to organ unavailability has increased
substantially, 66 and expected waiting times have begun to be measured in years
instead of months. It is also only within the past five or six years that insurance
companies and the Health Care Financing Administration have begun to cover
some non-renal (e.g., heart and liver) transplants.67 As a result, the magnitude
of the excess demand for transplantable organs has only recently increased to
the present level.6
Precisely for this reason, it has become imperative that all parties, including
those who benefit from the current shortage, reconsider their stand on organ
procurement policy: It is time to take the alternatives seriously.
Il1. A Market Alternative to Altruism
Advocating a market solution to the existence of excess demand is common-
place among economists and non-economists alike when the commodity in
question is a standard product normally traded on the market. When the scarce
resource in question is a human organ, however, this suggestion is much less
readily received 9.6 But before categorically opposing a market for organs, one
64. See Somerville, "Procurement" vs. "Donation"--Access to Tissues and Organs for Transplantation:
Should "Contracting Out" Legislation Be Adopted? 17 TRANSPLANT. PRoc. 53, 56 (Supp. IV 1985).
65. See Chapman, supra note 7, at 399.
66. Cohen, supra note 7, at 29; Peters, supra note 8, at 1302.
67. See Lutz, Organ Transplant Programs Multiply, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Mar. 4, 1988 at 30; Hayes,
When a Loved One Needs a Transplant, PARADE, Oct. 30, 1988.
68. In the past, the vast majority of organ transplants were kidneys, and due to the availability of
dialysis treatment, patients did not actually die from lack of a suitable organ . Today, however, with the
increasing viability of heart and liver transplants, it is possible to attribute deaths directly to the
unavailability of donor organs. See generally Peters, supra note 8.
69. Margaret Thatcher was quoted in Take My Kidney Please, TIME, Mar. 13, 1989, at 88, as expressing
the view that "the sale of kidneys or any organs of the body is utterly repugnant." British Health Minister
Roger Freeman apparently agrees: "The concept of organs being bought and sold for money is entirely
unacceptable in a civilized society." Kidney Sales Spur Attempt in Britain To Ban the Practice, Wall St.
J., July 10, 1989, at A5, col. 2,
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should at least examine the likely outcome of the market process.7" In this
section, we evaluate a market for organs from the economist's perspective of
maximizing social welfare. This analysis demonstrates the clear superiority, in
terms of the number of organs collected and of overall social welfare, of the
market over altruisim.
Because the issue of organ markets is so emotionally charged and often
misunderstood, let us be clear about what is not being proposed. We do not
propose barkers hawking human organs on street corners. We do not envision
transplant patients, or their agents, dickering for a heart or liver with families
of the recently deceased. We do not advocate an auction in which desperate
recipients bid against each other for life-sustaining organs. Finally, we do not
advocate a market for organs from living donors.7
While we might adopt any number of specific arrangements that rely upon
market processes to equilibrate demand and supply of cadaveric organs, the
following seems a likely scenario.72 Potential organ suppliers could be offered
some fixed payment (either in cash or in the form of a tax credit) in exchange
for entering a binding contract that authorizes removal of one or more of their
organs at death.73 For example, a specified sum could be paid to all individu-
als who sign the donor form on the back of their drivers' license. Such an
arrangement would correspond to a forward market for organs in that payment
would occur well in advance of expected delivery.
The size of the payment involved could be adjusted in order to yield an
adequate supply of organs for transplantation. That is, under shortage condi-
tions, the price could be increased to bring forth an additional quantity of
organs; and if an undesirably large excess supply should occur, this price could
be reduced.74 This process of adjustment would necessarily involve forecasts
of demand and actuarial estimates of supply based upon the expected incidence
of renal failure and the current stock of outstanding supply contracts.75 As in
70. Those who have analyzed a market for organs include Annas, Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Organ
Sales, 14 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 22 (1984); Brains, supra note 9; Cohen, supra note 7; Dukeminier, supra
note 7; Frier, supra note 9; Hansmann, supra note 9; Movrodes, supra note 9; Schwindt & Vining, supra
note 9; Note, Retailing Human Organs Under the Uniform Commerical Code, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
393 (1983); Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1182 (1974).
71. In fact, an institutionalized market for cadaveric organs would, in all likelihood, drive out a market
for organs from living donors, because for the majority of the population the opportunity cost of organs
obtained from cadavers is substantially less than the opportunity cost of organs obtained from living donors.
72. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 9, at 61-63 (examining feasible designs for an organ market); see
also Cohen, supra note 7 (same).
73. One advantage of this type of forward contract is that it eliminates the need for negotiation at the
time of death. See generally Cohen, supra note 7.
. 74. This adjustment process will occur naturally in response to any imbalance between supply and
demand. If a government controlled monopoly were purchasing the organs, it would have to adjust the price
offered to bring supply and demand into balance. If there are private procurement firms, they would bid
prices up in response to a shortage, thereby inducing an increase in the quantity supplied.
75. To be perfectly candid, this adjustment process is not apt to work perfectly. The time lags in
fatalities are quite long relative to predictable changes in demand and elaborate attempts to fine tune the
quantities are therefore unlikely to be very successful. Nevertheless, some adjustments are indeed possible.
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other markets where either demand or supply is uncertain (e.g., electricity and
agriculture), a margin of safety could be built into these estimates. In other
words, one could avoid shortages by consistently overestimating demand and/or
underestimating supply.
A. Supply of Kidneys
In the last section, we examined the demand for kidneys; now we turn our
attention to the supply. In Figure 3, we have reproduced the demand curve of
Figure 1, and have added a supply curve. We know that the supply curve
coincides with the quantity axis at Q1, because this is the observed quantity
supplied at a price of zero, but beyond that we cannot be sure of its shape.
Since we have never implemented a system in which individuals are
compensated for supplying organs at death,76 the price elasticity of supply of
cadaveric kidneys at prices above zero is uncharted water. This fact has been
noted by others who have written on this subject.77 And, as we shall see later,
this issue of the price elasticity of supply is extremely important to the formula-
tion of rational public policy in this area.
Two considerations suggest that the price elasticity of supply of cadaveric
organs may be relatively large (i.e., the supply curve may be relatively flat).
First, the low percentage of potential donors that currently supply their organs
at death indicates that a substantial increase in the quantity supplied is feasible.
Economically, the current situation is somewhat analogous to an industry with
excess productive capacity in that additional output may be obtained without
new investment. A price increase in such an industry generally leads to a
substantial increase in output. Second, survey evidence indicates that families
of deceased individuals generally are not strongly opposed to organ removal
at death.78 Thus, the current low rate of donorship stems from either a failure
Moreover, to guard against shortages, safety margins can be incorporated into the forecasts.
76. Compensation to suppliers under a market system could occur at the time of delivery (a spot
market), in which case the survivors of the person supplying the organ or organs would receive the payment;
or compensation could occur many years prior to delivery (a forward market), in which case the person
supplying the organ or organs would receive the payment. The latter system would correspond to what
Schwindt & Vining, supra note 7, refer to as a future delivery market. In practice, of course, both types
of markets could function simultaneously.
77. Schwindt & Vining, supra note 9, at 495 ("What remains unknown, because no such market has
functioned, is the potential supply of forward contracts."); Denise, supra note 4, at 1032 ("A frequently
cited virtue of a commercial organ market is its potential to save thousands of lives by generating a
sufficient supply of organs. The effect, however, of an organ market on the supply of available organs is
uncertain.").
78. See Prottas, Structure and Effectiveness, supra note 14, at 375 (reporting an average permission
rate of families who were asked to allow organ removal of 75.1 percent); Steinbrook, supra note 9, at 513
(describing evidence of similar permission rates).
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to request permission to remove organs at death7 9 or a lack of incentive to
supply such permission."0 This implies that it is probably not due to strongly
and widely held beliefs about the need for one's organs after death."' It there-
fore appears likely that even a small monetary incentive would lead to a
substantial increase in procurement rates; in other words, the price elasticity
of supply of cadaveric organs is relatively large.
Increases in supply under the current system historically have come about
through educational and promotional efforts that effectively increase Q, in
Figure 3, shifting the entire supply curve to the right. By making individuals
aware of the need for transplantable organs and by encouraging hospital staff
to identity potential donors, the number of cadaveric kidneys harvested has
79. Some states are making an effort to increase the number of donors. For example, Colorado currently
requires drivers' license applicants to indicate whether they are willing to allow their organs to be harvested
at death. Cohen, supra note 7, at 7 n.19. As this Article goes to press, these efforts have not resolved the
shortage.
80. Also, the current system requires that negotiations occur at the time of death, which is obviously
not the ideal time for negotiation with either the individual or her grieving family. A future delivery market
in conjunction with well-defined property rights would obviate the need to conduct any negotiations at death.
81. It is possible that part of the blame for the current system's failure is due to an inability to specify
how the donated organs would be used. Some individuals may be very willing to donate an organ to friends
and relatives, but unwilling to donate their organs to an anonymous recipient.
Supply
03 02 Quantity of Kidneys
Figure 3
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increased from 3,834 in 1980 to 4,929 in 1983 and almost 6,000 in 1987.82
As noted in Section I.B. above, however, this upward trend in supply has
persistently failed to keep pace with demand growth and has recently reversed.
Moreover, while the price paid to organ donors has remained at zero, the
increase in the number of organs harvested has certainly not been achieved at
zero cost. Organ procurement expenditures currently exceed $7,000 per kidney
harvested. Despite these expenditures, however, and despite the increases in
donorship that have been achieved, the distance between Q, and Q2 has contin-
ued to grow larger each year, and the social costs associated with this shortage
have grown correspondingly.
B. The Market Solution
The relevant economic comparison between the current altruistic system and
a market system is shown in Figure 3. The current altruistic system, in which
price is held fixed at zero, yields a solution at a quantity equal to Q, with a
resulting excess demand of Q2 - Q, and a market value of organs of P,. Under
a market system, the price is allowed to rise to its equilibrium 3 level of P3
and supply and demand are equilibrated at a quantity of Q3. The result is a
simultaneous increase in the quantity of cadaveric organs supplied of Q3 - Q,
and a decrease in the quantity demanded of Q2 - Q3. Thus, movement to a
market-based system of procurement involves an increase in both price and
quantity relative to the current system.
While the actual magnitudes of these increases cannot be precisely
calculated at this time, it appears likely (based upon our expectations regarding
demand and supply elasticities) that the price increase would be relatively small
and the quantity increase would be relatively large. That is, with a relatively
flat supply curve and a relatively steep demand curve, the bulk of the adjust-
ment in moving to a market system of cadaveric organ procurement will be in
the quantity supplied." Equilibrium price is likely to be relatively low, and
the reduction in the number of kidneys demanded is likely to be quite small
82. See Prottas, Structure and Effectiveness, supra note 14, at 365; Interchangeable Parts, supra note
24, at 63. The so-called "required request" laws passed by the federal government and a number of states
are designed to facilitate this process. These laws require physicians, hospital staff, or organ procurement
representatives to request from each potential donor's family permission to remove organs at death. It is
not clear how much effect such laws will have, however, since they impose no specific penalties on
violators.
83. "Equilibrium" in a free market refers to the state in which supply and demand are equal; there
are therefore no forces tending to increase or reduce quantity. In a disequilibrium, supply and demand will
be out of balance. If, for example, there is excess demand in a free market, the price is too low.
Disappointed buyers will bid up the price, which will cause an increase in the quantity supplied and a
decrease in the quantity demanded. This process will continue until the equilibrium price-quantity combina-
tion is reached. See generally R. Lipsey & P. Steiner, supra note 20.
84. Although the magnitudes will be affected by the shapes of the supply and demand curves, as long
as the supply curve is positively sloped, social welfare will be improved by resort to the market mechanism.
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(perhaps zero). Thus, the primary difference between the market solution and
the current system is that many more kidneys would become available under
the former policy.
C. Social Welfare and the Market Solution
Figure 4, which reproduces the supply and demand curves of Figure 3, may
be used to explore the gains and losses to donors and recipients in moving from
the current system to a market system. To do this, the demand and supply
curves must be more precisely understood. The demand curve reveals the
marginal valuation 5 that organ recipients collectively place on successive
organs made available for transplantation. That is, as we move down the
demand curve, we are moving successively from individuals willing to pay
higher prices for a transplantable organ to individuals willing to pay lower
prices. 6 Similarly, the supply curve reveals the marginal valuation placed by
their current owners on organs to be supplied at death. In other words, individ-
uals who place an extremely high value on burying the body intact (for reli-
gious or any other reasons) would be located far up the supply curve to the
right, and individuals who place a low value on burying their body with the
organs in place would be located down the supply curve to the left.
Given these straightforward interpretations of supply and demand, the
economic concepts of consumer and producer surplus can be used to examine
gains and losses under the two alternative systems we have described thus far.
Consumer surplus is given by the area under the demand curve and above the
price." It is the collective dollar valuation placed on all units purchased by
consumers minus the expenditure required to make those purchases.8 As such,
it shows the total dollar value attached to the units purchased above and beyond
what is actually paid for them. For example, at Q1 in Figure 4, the height of
the demand curve measures the value placed on that organ by the recipient just
willing to pay that price. If the price that she must pay is P3, then the difference
85. At a point on the demand curve, the price represents the value placed on the resource in question
by the consumer who was just willing to buy it; everyone else purchasing the product valued it more than
that. One may thus view the price as the marginal valuation consumers placed on the last unit purchased
at any particular quantity. See, e.g., J. HICKS, A REVISION OF DEMAND THEORY 86 (1956).
86. The demand function reflects inter alia the existing income distribution, which some may find
unacceptable. These distributional issues can however be resolved with other policy tools, such as taxes
and transfers.
87. This concept is not without ambiguity; see, e.g., J. HICKS, supra note 85, at 95-106; J. QUIRK &
R. SAPOSNIK, INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY AND WELFARE ECONOMICS (1968). But
see Willig, Consumer's Surplus Without Apology, 66 AM. ECON. REv. 589 (1976) (clearing up much of
the ambiguity by showing that this concept is a very good approximation of an unambiguous - but
unmeasurable - welfare concept). See generally H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN
APPROACH 242-55 (1987).
88. Since the vertical axis of the graph is price, denominated in dollars per unit, and the horizontal
axis is units, areas on the graph are denominated in dollars.
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between what she is willing to pay and what she must pay represents surplus
value, which we refer to as consumer surplus. If all potential recipients were
arrayed along the demand curve according to their willingness to pay, then the
area under the demand curve and above the price would represent the consumer
surplus for all organ recipients.
The supply curve shows the price at which potential donors will supply a
given quantity. As such, it represents the value that each potential donor places
on her organs. For example, at Q, the price that must be paid to get that
quantity is zero, while at Q3 the necessary price is P3. Producer surplus is given
by the area below the price and above supply. It shows the excess value
received by suppliers above the value placed upon the resource given up. If we
sum these two surpluses, we obtain overall social welfare, which is the excess
value received by both suppliers and consumers as a result of market exchange.
As the sum of consumer and producer surplus, it represents the net value that
society receives from allowing mutually agreeable and voluntary exchange to
take place.
Economists generally regard the objective of maximizing overall social
welfare to be the overriding criterion for selecting between alternative public
policies.89 That is, policy makers should attempt to select alternatives that
89. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, MICROECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS (1984); R. JUST, D. HuETH &
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yield the greatest sum of producer and consumer surplus.' Many economists
prefer this criterion because, through the compensation principle,9' it offers
the greatest potential gain to all affected parties. Suppose, for example, we have
two alternative policies, A and B. Policy A increases producer surplus but
decreases consumer surplus. Policy B increases both producer surplus and
consumer surplus. Suppose, however, that policy A offers the greater overall
social welfare. It should then be possible for producers to compensate consum-
ers under this policy so that both groups benefit more than they would under
policy B. The crucial insight here is that the issue of selecting a policy that
maximizes total net benefits can be addressed separately from the issue of
distributing those net benefits among the members of society.92 For these
reasons, we take overall social welfare to be an appropriate criterion for
selecting among the available policy options.
Under the current altruistic system with Q, units exchanged, the maximum
possible consumer surplus is given by the area below the demand curve
between zero and Q, kidneys. This is the sum of the areas marked as A and
B. The actual consumer surplus received under this system will fall short of
this area (perhaps by a very wide margin) because the organs that are made
available are not necessarily given to those potential recipients who place on
them the highest value, as measured by willingness to pay.93 Thus, A + B
constitutes an upper bound on the consumer surplus realized under the current
system. Producer surplus under this system is zero as both the supply curve and
the price fall on the horizontal axis between the origin and Q1. Therefore, A
+ B gives the maximum possible social welfare achieved under the current
altruistic system of procurement.
When we move to a market system, the price rises from zero to P3 and
quantity rises to Q3. As a result, consumers lose area B but gain area C. The
loss experienced is simply a reduction in excess value that results from the
price increase to those patients who are fortutate enough to receive an organ
under the current system. The gain is the consumer surplus realized by those
additional patients who, due to the increase in the number of organs available,
would be able to receive a transplant under the market system. Again, given
90. If total surplus, producer plus consumer, is maximized, society has the largest pie to split. Once
the size of the pie has been maximized, issues of optimal distribution of that pie can be considered and
policy tools can be brought to bear on the problem.
91. The compensation principle can be traced to Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939), and Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare
Economics, 49 EcoN. J. 696 (1939). This principle is simple: state of the world A is preferable to state of
the world B if everyone could be made better off through some feasible redistribution, i.e., if it is possible
for the gainers to compensate the losers. Note, however, that actual compensation need not be paid.
92. See, e.g., A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMIcS 343 (1980). This requires
that the redistribution be feasible. If so, the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle is satisfied.
93. Suppose, for example, that a recipient values the kidney received at $6,000 while someone who
did not receive a kidney valued it at $10,000. Consumer surplus, which is area A + B, will be reduced by
$4,000 as a result.
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the probable sizes of the elasticities involved, it appears likely that area C will
exceed area B so that total consumer surplus will probably increase with
movement to a market system. That is, the loss that consumers experience from
being forced to pay a non-zero price for the organs they currently obtain is
more than offset by the benefits associated with the additional organs that
become available. At the same time, suppliers gain area B plus area D. Thus,
suppliers clearly gain from movement to a market system. We can conclude,
therefore, that consumers will probably gain and suppliers will definitely gain
by adopting a market-based organ procurement policy.
Regardless of whether organ recipients experience a net increase in
consumer surplus, however, it is clear from Figure 4 that overall social welfare
will definitely rise by moving to a market system. This is true because the
surplus lost by consumers as a result of the price increase (area B) is gained
by suppliers. The consumers' loss is precisely offset by the producers' gain,
and society, as a whole, is unaffected by the transfer. At the same time, howev-
er, areas C and D are clear gains realized by consumers and producers, respec-
tively.94 Therefore, relative to the present altruistic system, a market system
of organ procurement creates an unambiguous net gain in overall social welfare.
And if, as we suspect, the demand curve is steep (highly price inelastic) and
the supply curve is relatively flat (highly price elastic), this overall net gain
(given by area C + D) could be quite substantial.9"
It might be argued that the overall net gain (C + D) would actually be
negative for certain supply-demand curve combinations. But consider the
extreme case, shown in Figure 5, in which a supply curve coincides with the
quantity axis between zero and Q, and then is vertical. Under the altruistic
system, the maximum consumer surplus is equal to areas A plus B as price is
zero and quantity is Q1. Given the peculiar supply curve under consideration,
a move to the market system will not increase the quantity. The price will equal
P, and the total surplus will be split between recipients and donors. The
recipients will have consumer surplus equal to area A while the donors will
experience producer surplus of B. Thus, total surplus does not appear to
increase in this case.
But that is an illusion. If society relies on the market, we know that those
who receive the organs value them at Pl or more and, therefore, consumer
94. The gainers could indeed compensate the losers when society moves to a market system. The
necessary transfer may not actually take place, but the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle does not require
actual transfers. See R. JUST, D. HUETH & A. SCHMrrz, supra note 89. In practice, any loss in consumer
surplus is apt to be small because the price of the organ is not likely to be high. Moreover, the federal End
Stage Renal disease program could easily be expanded to cover the cost of the organs. And because of
the savings acquired by getting patients off dialysis, this could be done without any increase in the overall
budget.
95. The welfare improvement is a somewhat complicated function of the elasticity of demand and the
elasticity of supply. A derivation of this function and the comparative statics analysis are available from
the authors upon request.
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surplus will be equal to area A. Under the altruistic system with non-price
rationing, those who receive the organs may place a far lower value on them.
In that event, total surplus will fall below the sum of areas A and B. Since
there is no reason to suppose that a non-price rationing device will happen to
identify those who place the highest value on the organs, one should expect the
total surplus to be lower under the present system than it would be with a
market system even with the peculiar supply curve assumed here.
D. Indirect Benefits
The analysis above demonstrates the unambiguous social welfare gain
achieved by a switch from the current altruistic system to a market system. The
additional kidneys that would become available under a market system would
provide obvious direct benefits to recipients. Patients receiving these kidneys
would experience improved health and would be relieved of the tiring process
of dialysis. In addition to these direct benefits, however, there are several
indirect benefits that would flow from a market regime.
First, an increase in the quantity of cadaveric kidneys supplied should lead
to improvements in tissue matching between the transplanted organs and their
recipients. In addition, the increased quantity supplied would allow surgeons
to be more selective about the overall physical condition of the organs trans-
planted. Under the current system, the chronic shortage may at times force
Demand
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surgeons to utilize less-than-ideal matches or low quality kidneys.96 This of
course results in a reduced rate of success in transplantation. The enhanced
supply of organs expected to accompany movements to a market system of
procurement, however, would make greater selectivity possible, and thereby
improve cadaveric organ transplant success rates.
Second, an expansion in the number of cadaveric kidneys made available
for transplantation would permit a reduced reliance upon living related (or
unrelated) donors. The current costs to such donors in terms of lost time from
work, the pain of major surgery, and the risks that result from loss of a kidney
are not reflected in any current dollar figures. Nonetheless, such costs are very
real to these donors. With the improvements that have been made in immuno-
suppressive therapy over the past decade, such costs are probably no longer
warranted by differential success rates between cadaveric and living related
donors. Rather, the continued heavy reliance on the living donors is more likely
due to the prolonged waiting period and uncertainty associated with the use of
cadaveric donors. An increase in the quantity of such organs supplied would
largely alleviate these problems.
Third, as noted above, people who have been approached concerning kidney
donation also constitute the principal source of hearts and livers for transplanta-
tion.97 That is, the procurement efforts of the End Stage Renal Disease pro-
gram not only yield kidneys but other transplantable organs as well. An
increased number of kidneys harvested under a market regime will therefore
be accompanied by an increased number of hearts, livers, and other organs.
Thus, patients in need of these other organs will also benefit from adopting a
market system of kidney procurement. In fact, the enhanced supply of other
organs may well be a primary source of the social benefits obtainable from such
a policy.
Fourth, an increase in the quantity of organs supplied is likely to lead to
reductions in the costs of performing transplant operations, especially hearts
and livers, through learning curve effects.98 For example, the cost of a kidney
transplant has fallen from about $100,000 to about $25,000 over the 1962-1988
period.9 9 Heart, liver, lung, pancreas, and other organ transplantations are now
at a relatively early stage of development. A substantial increase in the number
of such transplants performed annually could have a dramatic effect on the
costs of these types of surgery. As these costs fall, the treatment would become
available to an increasing number of individuals in need of such operations.
96. See Denise, supra note 4, at 1019.
97. See generally Prottas, Structure and Effectiveness, supra note 14; Prottas, Organization of
Procurement, supra note 32.
98. See R. BLAIR AND L. KENNY, MICROECONOMICS WITH BUSINESS APPLICATIONS 295-99 (1987).
99. Hayes, supra note 67, at 8.
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Finally, as the idea of harvesting cadaveric organs becomes increasingly less
novel, the desire on the part of individuals to bury the body intact may wane.
That is, community preferences concerning organ supply are likely to be
affected by the existing procurement system and the success of that system. The
increased rate of procurement under a market system appears likely to acceler-
ate the erosion of whatever aversion to supplying organs at death currently
exists. The result would be an outward shift in supply over time with a corre-
sponding reduction in the market-clearing price.
E. Mechanics of a Market for Kidneys
In this Section we describe some of the concrete features a market for
kidneys might display. It is first important to note that a fundamental prerequi-
site for the functioning of this system, or of any other market-based arrange-
ment, is the legal clarification of property rights in this area. Physicians must
be entirely confident that they have the legal right, or even obligation, to
remove needed organs from the cadaver of a person who has executed a supply
contract. That is, the contract should not be subject to renegotiation or unilateral
cancellation by the family of the deceased. It should carry the legal force of
a will with no right of contestment.'l°
The supply contract, however, need not be irreversible. Those entering into
such contracts could be allowed to buy back their agreement at any point at
some appropriate price (perhaps, the original price paid to them plus interest).
In fact, it would be feasible to allow surviving family members to engage in
a similar buy-back if desired. Where the price is allowed to adjust to market
clearing levels, such buy-back provisions will not lead to any chronic shortages.
In addition to the forward market, a spot market for kidneys and other
organs could be instituted as well. Under a spot market arrangement, the organ
procurement firm would approach the surviving family members of potential
donors in much the same way that current organ procurement officers do.
Similar appeals to altruism and the opportunity to salvage something good
(helping someone else improve their health, or perhaps, even save their life)
out of an otherwise tragic experience (the loss of the relative who is to be the
donor) could be made by the organ collection firm's representative. Thus, a spot
market for cadaveric organs would function in much the same way as the
current system.
There would be two important differences between the market system
(whether spot or forward) and the current altruistic system. First, under the
market system, either the donor (with a forward market) or the donor's surviv-
ing family members (with a spot market) would receive compensation in
100. This provision is necessary because organs are extremely perishable.
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exchange for the organs supplied. For example, under the spot market arrange-
ment, the surviving family members would be offered some payment (deter-
mined by the market) in exchange for allowing the organs to be removed. Such
payment would function like a premium-free, term life insurance policy on the
deceased.
The second important difference between these two systems of cadaveric
organ procurement is that the market system introduces an additional party with
a direct profit incentive to see to it that potential organ donors or their families
are informed about the opportunity to donate (or sell) their organs. 0 'Under
the present system, a major reason for the low collection rates we observe is
that no one in the system has a direct profit interest in assuring that potential
donors are, in fact, asked to donate. Since requesting a donation is an unpleas-
ant task and since no one with responsibility to discuss the issue with surviving
family members has any financial stake in performing this task, in most cases
it simply does not get done. That is, in all likelihood, the primary cause of the
low organ collection rate (or the organ shortage) under the current system is
that potential organ donors are never asked to donate." 2 This flaw in the
current system would be corrected under a market approach to cadaveric organ
procurement.
Since a major cause of the organ shortage may be the failure to ask poten-
tial donors to donate, one may reasonably ask why Congress has not simply
passed a law requiring physicians to ask patients and their families for organ
donations. In fact, many states do have required request laws. These laws place
a legal obligation upon the.physician or someone on the hospital staff to raise
the issue of organ donation. 3 Most of these statutes, however, provide
exemptions that can undermine the effectiveness of the legislation."° More-
over, raising this issue during the critical few hours immediately following a
death imposes substantial psychological stress on the physician as well as on
the grieving family. If the requests for organ donations were made, the kidney
shortage might vanish, 10 5 but since it has not vanished, we infer that they are
101. There is little danger that these private procurement firms will be offensive in dealing with the
families of dying or recently deceased people. The market will discipline those firms that are prone to
tasteless excesses. In the funeral industry, for example, competition among funeral homes does not result
in unseemly bidding for business.
102. This second distinction is extremely important to keep in mind in discussions of alternative organ
procurement policies. For example, some parties are currently advocating the compensation of donors by
the government under the current system as a solution to the organ shortage. Peters, supra note 8.
Compensation alone would alleviate the shortage only if the cause of low collection rates is a refusal to
donate by surviving family members. If, on the other hand, low collection rates are due to a failure of the
current system to provide a sufficient incentive for anyone to request donation from surviving family
members, then compensation alone will not solve the organ shortage.
103. See Rodgers, Legal Framework for Organ Donation and Transplantation, 24 NURSING CLINCS
OF N. AMER. 837, 840 (1989)
104. Id.
105. See Silver, supra note 7, at 707 (contending that "...an emerging wisdom now attributes inadequate
organ supply not to a dearth of consents but to a dearth of requests.").
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not being made."te Finally, statutes that require individuals to perform dis-
agreeable tasks must be enforced, which in this case is highly problematic.1°7
In sum, an important feature of the market is that it offers incentives for
participation to all parties.
A number of alternative market structures are possible for implementing
a market system of procurement. The two extremes are a government-operated
or regulated monopoly and a competitive private market. Under the former, an
agency of the federal government such as the Health Care Financing Admin-
istration (which funds current procurement efforts) would establish the price
and make payments to those individuals entering into supply contracts. The
agency could then charge organ recipients (or their insurance companies for
those with insurance coverage) the average cost of the organs actually collected
and used. "'Alternatively, it could include these procurement expenses under
the current End Stage Renal Disease program and provide the organs to recipi-
ents free of charge.
Under a competitive private market system, procurement firms (much like
the current organ procurement agencies) would pay individuals to supply
organs. These firms then would collect the organs at death and sell them to
transplant centers for use in transplantation. Under this system, the transplant
centers could incorporate the price paid for organs as a part of the overall bill
for the transplant procedure. With free entry into and exit from the organ
procurement business, such a market would yield competitive market-clearing
prices. |°9
As we noted earlier, however, for either of these systems to function effec-
tively, property rights must be clearly defined and enforced.
IV. Reassignment of Property Rights
An alternative to both the current system of procurement and our proposed
market system involves a reassignment of property rights in cadaveric organs
from the supplier to either the recipient or to the state, acting on behalf of the
recipient. 10 As Nobel Laureate George Stigler has pointed out, government
106. Id. at 708.
107. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 21 (pointing out that required request statutes succeed in imposing
neither positive nor negative incentives on doctors or hospitals).
108. The average cost of the organs collected under this system would exceed the price paid to
individuals for signing supply contracts. This is true because many (or most) of the supply contracts would
fail to yield a transplantable organ due to death in unfavorable circumstances (age, illness, and so on).
109. The cost structure of the organ procurement function determines which of the above options would
be most effective. If this cost structure is characterized by large economies of scale, then a single collection
agency may he optimal. But if economies of scale are exhausted at relatively low levels of collection (as
seems more likely), then a competitive private market will yield lower costs and lower prices.
110. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 9; Caplan, supra note 12; Dukeminier, supra note 7; Dukeminier &
Sanders, supra note 9; Jaffe, 'She's Got Bette Davis['s] Eyes': Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of
Cadaver Organs under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 528 (1990); Matas, Arras,
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has a monopoly over legal coercive powers,"' which it uses regularly to
define and redefine property rights in a wide variety of situations. For example,
the pollution laws of the past two decades have significantly circumscribed the
rights of firms to make free use of water and air resources as convenient
garbage dumps."' Additional examples abound."3 The point is that govern-
ment, through its power to define and redefine property rights, can exert a
tremendous influence over the allocation of resources. Cadaveric organs for
transplantation are no exception.
Among the many ways in which property rights could be reassigned, we
shall examine one. Specifically, we assume that property rights to the organs
of deceased individuals are reassigned to potential organ transplant recipients,
and the current policy of a zero price is maintained." 4
A. Presumed Consent Distinguished
A policy that effectively reassigns property rights should not be confused
with the policy of "presumed consent," which has been adopted in at least
fourteen European countries." 5 Under presumed consent, physicians and
organ procurement personnel are presumed to have the individual's and surviv-
ing family members' consent to remove needed organs at death unless these
potential suppliers expressly make their preferences to the contrary known
beforehand. Since organ suppliers can "buy back" their organs at a price of zero
simply by stating their unwillingness to donate, however, they effectively retain
property rights to their organs under this policy." 6 The economic effect of
such a policy is to reduce the transaction costs of obtaining a donated organ
and to shift these costs from the organ procurement representative to the organ
Muyskens, Tellis, & Veith, A Proposal for Cadaver Organ Procurement: Routine Removal with Right of
Informed Refusal, 10 J. HEALTh POL., POL'Y & LAW 231 (1985); Silver, supra note 9; Stuart, Veith, &
Cranford, supra note 12.
111. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. ScL 3 (1971).
112. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1988), Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251-1376 (1988) and their subsequent amendments.
113. For economic and legal analyses of property rights, see generally ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS (Y. Barzel ed. 1989); ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (B. Ackerman ed.
1975); THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS (H. Manne ed. 1975); THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS (E. Furubotn & S. Pejovich eds. 1974).
114. Alternatively, property rights could be reassigned, and the market price then allowed to rise to
its equilibrium level. This approach would yield the same outcome (in terms of both price and the number
of organs transplanted) as a market-based system with property rights vested in potential organ suppliers.
The only difference that would occur with this reassignment of property rights is that potential organ
recipients would receive monetary compensation for those organs that potential suppliers wish to purchase
in order to bury. Thus, the flow of payment would be reversed with a reassignment of property rights; but
if the market were allowed to function freely, the number of organs obtained for transplantation would be
unaffected.
115. Cohen, supra note 7, at 15; Caplan, supra note 12, at 24.
116. If potential suppliers were required to pay for the right to retain their organs at death, then
presumed consent would be equivalent to a reassignment of property rights with buy-back privileges.
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supplier. Thus, property rights are not reassigned with presumed consent, but
the manner in which they are exercised is altered. As a result, presumed consent
is simply another (potentially more effective) method for shifting the supply
curve outward at a zero price under the current altruistic system.
Presumed consent is not free of criticism. Most importantly, it does not
appear to remove the organ shortage. Stuart, Veith, and Cranford"7 report
that those countries with presumed consent statutes continue to experience
shortages, which they attribute to the absence of appropriate incentives for
hospital-based physicians and nurses to participate fully."' There are,
however, other problems with presumed consent. First, it is exploitive in the
sense that many people are reluctant to expressly revoke consent, which is
however necessary if one does not want the organs harvested." 9 To the extent
that presumed consent works because people hesitate to object to something
that they do not want done, this policy has an unsound foundation. Second, pre-
sumed consent may also exploit ignorance or temporary confusion. Most organs
are harvested from accident victims. Their families may not take the affirmative
step of objecting to organ removal at that critical point when a loved one dies
either because they are unaware of the imminent removal of the organs or
because they do not think about it in their time of grief.2 Third, presumed
consent raises some thorny constitutional issues.' Jaffe contends that under
the Due Process Clause presumed consent will not afford patients and their
families adequate notice and an opportunity for objecting. 2 1 Furthermore,
under the Takings Clause, the state must provide just compsenation.'23 Ordi-
narily, just compensation means fair market value. 2' If that is the case,
money is going to change hands anyway and we may as well rely upon market
forces.
B. True Reassignment of Property Rights
In contrast to presumed consent, with a true reassignment of property rights,
potential suppliers no longer own the cadaveric organs, and consequently, are
117. See Stuart, Veith, & Cranford, supra note 12, at 239.
118. See infra Section B.
119. Silver, supra note 9, at 706.
120. See Silver, id. (referring to this as "conscription in disguise," which seems apt. Silver also points
out that families who are aware of the imminent organ removal face the strain of deciding whether to object
at a time when one should not have to make difficult decisions).
121. Silver, id., at 708-18; see also Jaffe, supra note 110, at 547. Some serious constitutional conflicts
could also arise due to religious beliefs. For some thoughts on the religious ramifications of transplants,
see May, Religious Obstacles and Warrants for the Donation of Body Parts, 20 TRANSPLANT. PROC. 1079
(1988); Sachedina, Islamic Views on Organ Transplantation, 20 TRANSPLANT. PROC. 1084 (1988); Weiss,
Organ Transplantation, Medical Ethics, and Jewish Law, 20 TRANSPLANT. PROC. 1071 (1988).
122. Jaffee, supra note 110, at 561-67.
123. id. at 571.
124. See Jaffee, Id. at 571-72 (examining alternate ways of determining just compensation).
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unable to wield any power over their use. The outcome under this policy is the
complete elimination of the shortage as shown in Figure 6, which reproduces
the supply and demand curves of Figure 4. Given the right to collect desired
organs at a price of zero, potential transplant recipients will choose to obtain
a total of Q2 organs from cadavers. Thus, the number of transplants performed
under this policy is apt to exceed, by a small amount, the number performed
under a market-based system (which, in turn, exceeds, by a large amount, the
number performed under the current system). The size of the increase relative
to the current system, which is Q2 - Q1, may be quite substantial. Due to the
relatively inelastic demand, however, the size of the increase relative to a
market system, which is Q2 - Q3, is likely to be comparatively small. This latter
increase is entirely due to the demand-side effect of the reduction in price from
its (relatively low) market equilibrium level to zero. The steeper the demand
curve at point E (i.e., the less elastic the demand) the smaller will be the
quantity response to any given price change.
In fact, it is conceivable or even likely that the demand for transplantable
organs is totally price inelastic (i.e., vertical) at low prices. If that is the case,
then the market-based system and the reassignment of property rights will yield
exactly the same number of transplants (i.e., Q2 and Q3 will converge). A
major difference between these two policy options in that case would be the
distribution of the benefits of exchange. Under the market system, these benefits
are shared between organ suppliers and recipients; but under the reassignment
of property rights, organ recipients receive all of the benefits of exchange and
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organ suppliers receive none. These distributional effects result from the
difference in price under these two alternative regimes-a positive price with
market exchange and a zero price with a redefinition of property rights.
This result is displayed in Figure 7, which reproduces the supply curve of
our earlier figures but represents demand as vertical or perfectly inelastic at low
prices and negatively sloped at higher prices. Under a market system, the
intersection of demand and supply will yield the socially optimal quantity equal
to Q and the socially optimal price of P. Consumer surplus is represented by
area A while producer surplus is represented by area B. The total social surplus
is the sum of areas A and B. In contrast, the reassignment of property rights
will result in the same quantity but a price of zero. Consumers surplus is equal
to areas A plus B plus C. Producer surplus is negative and equal to at least area
C. In this case, consumers (recipients) get all of the benefit while producers
(donors) suffer a net loss.
Since any redistribution of benefits within a society is a pure transfer
between the affected groups, overall social welfare would appear, at first blush,
to be the same under either policy when demand is perfectly inelastic. This
initial impression, however, is incorrect. Since price is not allowed to perform
its rationing function under a redefinition of property rights, kidneys will not
be taken first from those donors who place a relatively low value on them.
Instead, the Q kidneys that are collected will be drawn at random from the
population of potential donors. Unlike the market system, a redefinition of
property rights does not differentiate between donors who place a relatively low
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value and donors who place a relatively high value on burying the body with
the organs intact. As a result, even though the number of organs transplanted
will be the same under these two policies where organ demand is perfectly
inelastic, social welfare will be unambiguously higher under the market-based
procurement system.
When the demand curve is not perfectly inelastic at low prices, both the
number of transplants performed and social welfare will differ under these two
alternative policies. In this case, as before, overall social welfare will be
unambiguously lower under the reassignment of property rights approach. To
see this, we make use of our earlier interpretation of overall social welfare. 125
As we move from point Q3 to point Q2 in Figure 6, there is a gain in consumer
surplus equal to the triangle EQ3Q 2.This area represents the additional benefits
received by organ recipients as a result of lowering the price to zero. At the
same time, however, there is negative producer surplus created that is at least
as large as the quadrangle EQ3Q2F. This area represents the minimum value
to suppliers of the additional organs given up for which no compensation is
received. The difference between the sum of the consumer and producer surplus
under these two alternative systems is represented by triangle EQ 2F. This is the
minimum decrease in social welfare caused by the reassignment in property
rights, which forces people who value their organs to surrender them at a zero
price.
The actual loss in value to organ suppliers may in fact be even greater. As
we discussed above, given a price of zero, the Q2 organs harvested will be
drawn from potential suppliers at random instead of taking them in ascending
order of the value placed on them by their owners. That is, some of the organs
transferred from donors to recipients may have a value to their current owners
far above point F on the supply curve. As a result, the area given by EQ3Q 2F
provides a lower bound on the negative producer surplus created by the reas-
signment of property rights. It is apparent that the loss in producer surplus
swamps the gain in consumer surplus, and that social welfare therefore declines
as a result of moving from a market system to a reassignment of property
rights. 126
In addition to its economic shortcomings, a reassignment of property rights
appears to be inferior to a market system of cadaveric organ procurement on
ethical grounds as well. Under the latter policy, organ suppliers willingly
exchange the organs of the deceased for some form of payment; while under
the former policy, the organs are simply taken regardless of the religious or
moral beliefs of the donor or the donor's family and regardless of the monetary
125. See supra Figure 4 and accompanying text.
126. The precise magnitude of the superiority of the market system over a reassignment of property
rights depends upon the elasticities of supply and demand. A derivation is available from the authors upon
request.
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value these individuals place on being able to bury the body intact. That is, the
reassignment of property rights makes no distinction whatsoever among individ-
uals who may place vastly divergent values on burying the organs of the
deceased. Consequently, this policy eliminates these individuals' rights to
decide how the remains are to be buried. As a result, it is unlikely to enjoy
widespread support in a society that places a high value on individual liberties.
In comparing the market system to this reassignment of property rights, we
conclude that there may be somewhat fewer transplants with the market system,
but that social welfare will be unambiguously higher. Thus, the market system
is superior and should be the socially preferred policy. Given the presumed
relative elasticity of supply, however, the current altruistic system is inferior
to either of these alternatives in terms of the number of transplants performed.
Moreover, the altruistic system is clearly inferior to the market system in terms
of the social welfare criterion. 12 7 And, given a price elastic supply and a price
inelastic demand, it is likely that the altruistic procurement policy is also
inferior to the reassignment of property rights on social welfare grounds. Thus,
the present policy appears to represent the worst of all worlds in terms of both
the number of transplants performed and the social welfare achieved.
V. Economic Objections to a Market for Kidneys
In spite of the persuasive case for reliance upon the forces of supply and
demand to alleviate the organ shortage, there have been two economic argu-
ments made against using the market system. 2 First, it is argued that the
market environment may cause some former altruists to refuse to supply their
organs at death. Second, opponents of a market system claim that such a system
may cause the quality of the organs supplied to be lower. We examine these
economic objections here and defer treatment of the ethical concerns to a later
section.
A. Discontinuous Organ Supply
The first economic argument against a market system involves the possibili-
ty of a discontinuous organ supply curve at prices above zero. Several commen-
tators have argued that implementing a positive price (compensating the donor
or the donor's family) would reduce the desire of some individuals to donate
127. See supra Figures 4 and 5 and accompanying text.
128. Those who prefer the altruistic system rarely offer any persuasive economic objections to a market
system. More typical is some conclusory statement without much support. See, e.g., Note, Regulating the
'Gift of Life': the 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 65 WASH. L. REv. 171, 181 (1990) (asserting that
"[tlhe present altruistic system offers social benefits that outweigh the speculative increase in organ supply
promised by adding financial incentives.").
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their organs.'29 In other words, while some people who will not donate at a
price of zero might be encouraged to supply organs at a positive price, others
who are willing to donate their organs freely would refuse to supply their
organs at all if compensation were offered. 30 If the number discouraged from
donating exceeds the number encouraged to sell, then the actual quantity of
kidneys made available for transplantation could fall with an increase in price
above zero. That is, the supply curve could exhibit an acute discontinuity near
the horizontal axis. It would then appear as in Figure 8 where supply jumps
129. There is some weak evidence that such a discontinuity may exist. The impact on supply when
blood sales were first allowed in the United States apparently reflected this type of behavior. See generally
R. TrrMuss, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP 64-67 (1970); Denise, supra note 4. In addition, survey evidence
indicates that the phenomenon may carry over to organ supply as well. See Pessemier, Bemmaor, &
Hanssens, Willingness to Supply Human Body Parts: Some Empirical Results, 4 J. CONSUM. RES. 131
(1977); see also Lee, The Organ Supply Dilemma: Acute Responses to an Acute Shortage, 20 COLUM. J.
L. & Soc. PROB. 363, 398-99 (1986). But see Hansmann, supra note 9, at 67-68 (pointing out that too much
may have been made out of the blood supply experience). First, donation rates of those strongly predisposed
to donate blood fell, but those who were not so predisposed were more inclined to donate for a relatively
low price. Second, the low price offered may have given a false signal to the donors regarding the value
of the blood. Finally, it is not clear that such experiments would carry over to organs that are to be harvested
after death.
130. See Manga, supra note 56, at 328 (explaining the logic of this reaction: "The commercialization
of organs ... affects the meaning of the gift to the donor. When unpriced, it is often perceived to be a
'priceless' gift essential to the saving of a life. With its commercialization it has a price, one which merely
denotes how much a donor is saving the procurement agency should he decide to donate it rather than sell
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from Q, at a zero price to Q3 at a price of P3 with the implementation of
positive prices.
If such a discontinuity is present, then an important empirical question is
the magnitude of the difference between Q, and Q3. In other words, how much
supply restriction is likely to occur with implementation of cadaveric organ
sales? In addition, the size of the price elasticity of supply above P3 becomes
an extremely important empirical issue in the event such a discontinuity is
present. If supply is relatively flat above this point, then any reduction in the
quantity supplied in moving from Q, to Q3 may be more than compensated for
by increasing price above P3.
It is important to know whether a discontinuity exists because the presence
of a supply discontinuity could influence the optimal method of reimbursement
under a market-based system of organ procurement. A bifurcated payment
scheme similar to the current method used to obtain blood may permit policy
makers to simultaneously move along both segments of the supply curve. 131
Thus, individuals interested in selling their organs at death could be offered
direct compensation while those more prone to donate could be offered an
indirect incentive such as guaranteed free access to needed organs in the event
they should require a transplant themselves. For higher income individuals, this
sort of payment in kind may be worth more than direct monetary compensation
because of the taxes that are thereby avoided. Obviously, other possible meth-
ods exist for discriminating between individuals who are willing to donate and
those who must be paid.
Impact on Number of Transplants If there were a significant discontinuity
in the kidney supply function, it is theoretically possible that movement to a
market-based system of procurement could result in fewer transplant operations
being performed. Such a possibility is depicted in Figure 7; where the market
equilibrium occurs at a price and quantity of P4 and Q4, respectively. Altruistic
supply, however, yields Q, kidneys for transplantation at a price of zero. Thus,
movement from the current altruistic policy to a market regime apparently leads
to a net reduction of Q, - Q4 transplantable kidneys. By this logic, adoption of
a market based procurement policy does not guarantee an increase, and could
even lead to a reduction, in the number of cadaveric kidneys made available
for transplantation.
This hypothetical, however, deserves considerable skepticism. Two observa-
tions indicate that a market system of procurement would not be likely to create
a reduction in the number of transplants. Rather, it appears to assure a substan-
tial increase. First, kidney demand is, in all likelihood, highly price inelastic,
meaning that the quantity demanded will not fall much in response to an
131. But see Note, Regulating the 'Gift of Life, 'supra note 125, at 178-80 (recognizing this possibility,
but deferring to the current system apparently due to the current federal law).
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increase in price. And second, the current system yields substantial excess
demand. In terms of Figure 8, this means that (a) the distance between Q, and
Q2 is large, and (b) the demand curve is steep above Q2. Given these observa-
tions, then, it is highly unlikely that supply and demand will intersect at a
quantity smaller than Q,. For example, in Figure 8, it was necessary to draw
the demand curve as being highly elastic in order to yield a reduction in the
number of organs collected. This is simply not the case for transplantable
organs. Demands for these organs are steep (or highly inelastic). Thus, it seems
extremely farfetched to claim that adopting a market-based system of organ
procurement would lead to a net reduction in the number of organs made
available for transplantation as a result of discontinuous supply. The situation
depicted in Figure 4 is far more plausible. We conclude, therefore, that a
market-based procurement policy will yield more (and, in all likelihood,
substantially more) kidneys than the current altruistic system.
B. Deterioration of Organ Quality
The second economic argument regarding the use of a market system of
procurement involves the potential effect on the average quality of the organs
harvested. 32 Substituting payments for altruism is likely to reduce the rela-
tive, although not necessarily the absolute, number of organs obtained from
comparatively higher income individuals. To the extent that there is a positive
correlation between health and income, adopting a market system may decrease
the average quality of the organs obtained for transplantation. Thus, some argue
for preserving the current altruistic system in order to maintain organ
quality. 33 By selecting the current system over a market system, we are seen
to be trading quantity for quality. And since organ quality is an important factor
influencing the success of the transplant operation, such a tradeoff appears, at
first blush, to be potentially justifiable."u
Two considerations, however, indicate that the organ quality argument is
greatly overstated. First, it is not at all clear that the presumed drop in average
quality will materialize. While the forces described above may operate in that
direction, other (perhaps, more powerful) forces operate in the opposite direc-
tion. As we pointed out earlier, under the current shortage conditions, surgeons
132. See Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLuM. L. REV. 931
(1985) (pointing to quality control as a possible justification for modified inalienability, which permits
donations, but does not permit sales).
133. Rose-Ackerman, id. at 947 (pointing out that "the quality control benefits of gift giving operate
only on the supply side of the market."). There is no quality control argument against selling the organs
to the patients.
134. Rose-Ackerman, id., (also recognizes that "undersupply may continue to be a serious problem.").
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may be tempted, or even forced, to make use of substandard organs.'35 The
increased number of organs that would become available under a market system
of procurement, however, would enable physicians to exercise greater selectivity
in screening acceptable organs for transplantation. Organ quantity and organ
quality are not independent variables. Through enhanced screening procedures,
an increase in quantity can lead to a corresponding increase in quality.
Second, transplant centers or collection agencies, either the government or
private firms, are able to distinguish organ quality ex ante (prior to the trans-
plant operation). The organs for transplant come from cadavers. The organs
cannot be compared to blood collected from living donors who might be
infected. For organs, the donor pool is the set of accident victims. Paying for
organs will not increase the supply of dead people. Hospitals can and routinely
do conduct tests to detect the presence of disease or drug use. Consequently,
a potential decrement in the average quality of organs collected need not lead
to a decrement in the average quality of organs transplanted. Surgeons perform-
ing transplant operations can establish minimum quality standards, and the
market price can adjust to yield an adequate supply of organs that meet these
standards. We conclude, therefore, that the quality of organs transplanted is
likely to improve rather than deteriorate with the adoption of a market system
of procurement.
VI. Ethical Arguments Against a Market System
Despite the clear superiority of a market-based system of procurement on
social welfare grounds, and despite the glaring inferiority of the current altruis-
tic system relative to both of the alternative policies analyzed above, depen-
dence upon altruism has persisted in the United States for at least the past
twenty years. Advocates of the altruistic system of procurement argue that it
is superior to a market system on moral or ethical grounds. 136 Both the Amer-
ican Medical Association and the American Hospital Association have
expressed their support of the current system and their ethical opposition to a
market-based approach. 37 Moreover, three separate transplant associations
have recently passed resolutions that allow for expulsion of any member who
135. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., R. TrrMuss, supra note 129, at 73 (arguing that "[tlhe social relations set up by gift
exchange are among the most powerful forces which bind a social group together."). See also Task Force
On Organ Transplantation, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 28 (1986)
(Altruism "...promottes] a sense of community through acts of generosity."). But see Hansmann, supra note
9, (examining some of the ethical issues raised by having a market for organs. His anlysis shows that many
of these concerns have been asserted without much, if any, analysis).
137. See Schwindt & Vining, supra note 9, at 485.
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takes part in organ purchases and sales.'38 One such resolution characterizes
a market system as "abhorrent" and "completely morally and ethically irrespon-
sible."'139  This strong opposition to a market-based approach to organ pro-
curement is obstensibly grounded on ethical concerns." Since the implemen-
tation of virtually any change in procurement practices will require the coopera-
tion of these professionals, it is essential to fully explore the logical basis for
their policy position.
Although ethical concerns with a market system are often poorly
articulated,' 4' three major issues appear to dominate discussions in this area.
The first concern is that the poor may be economically coerced into supplying
organs.142 The second concern is that if kidneys must be purchased, relatively
low income individuals may not be able to afford a transplant. 4 3 Third, some
concern has been expressed about the potential effects on the incentive to
maintain adequate care for critically ill patients)" We evaluate each of these
points in turn.
A. Economic Coercion of the Poor
Voluntary exchange between a willing buyer and a willing seller usually
cannot make either party worse off and typically makes both parties better off.
However, commentators argue that a market for organs may induce the poor
to sell their organs out of need; this phenomenon, they argue, constitutes
coercion. The absence of a market in organs, by this logic, actually protects
them from doing something that they do not want to do. This reasoning,
however, is seriously flawed and completely misconstrues the nature of coercion
and voluntary exchange.
138. See Denise, supra note 4, at 1035. See also Cohen, supra note 7, at 24 n.8 (noting that these
associations are the American Society of Transplant Surgeons, the American Society of Transplant
Physicians, and the International Transplantation Society).
139. Denise, supra note 4. at 1035.
140. Not all physicians share this view. For example, one transplant surgeon, who is chairman of the
United Network for Organ Sharing donations Committee, has said that "... the public has to make a decision
as to whether they would rather see people die on dialysis while leading a fairly unsatisfactory life ... or
allow the buying and selling of human organs." See Bailey, Should I Be Allowed To Buy Your Kidney
36 BREAKTHROUGHS 41 (1991).
141. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1112 (1972) (referring to nonmonetizable external costs suffered
by those opposed to the sale of organs as moralisms that result in rules of inalienability). The difficulty with
such a rule is that the benefits to the participants in a market transaction can be outweighed in the political
process by some nonmonetizable distress experienced by a large group of nonparticipants. Nearly any
tyranny of the majority can be justified on this basis.
142. See, e.g., Manga, supra note 56, at 325-26; Note, Regulating the 'Gift of Life,' supra note 128,
at 178; See also Forum: Sacred Or For Sale?, 281 HARPER'S 47 (1990) (William May, a medical ethicist,
predicts that "[tihe rich would buy and the poor would sell.").
143. See, e.g., Manga, supra note 56, at 324 (claiming that "[tlhe allocation of organs on the basis of
ability to pay obviously violates the egalitarian ethic of distributive justice.....
144. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 7, at 9.
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The essence of coercion is to induce an action through force or threat. As
Fried points out, "a threat worsens the recipient's situation." 4 5 For example,
it is obvious that the mugger's challenge - "Your money or your life" - is
fundamentally different from entering into a voluntary exchange. The mugger's
challenge is coercive because she offers a choice between two alternatives, both
of which make the recipient worse off. In contrast, it cannot be coercive merely
to solicit the sale of a valuable asset.
We must be very careful to distinguish allocative matters involving the
market from inequities inherent in the distribution of society's wealth. This
confusion can be exemplified in William May's concern for distributional
equity. As he points out, "A poor mother who sells her organs in order to save
her child is acting nobly. But that noble act does not redeem the tawdriness of
a social system that would force a poor parent to help her child that way."'
146
No one applauds an income distribution that offers no better way to save a poor
child. Nonetheless, foreclosing the only option available to the poor mother
does not cure the social malady.
Several medical ethicists have expressed opposition to the use of market
forces (compensation) to increase cadaveric organ supply on the grounds that
families of deceased individuals may be "economically coerced" into agreeing
to organ sales that violate their fundamental religious or moral beliefs.
147
There are at least four major problems with the economic coercion argument.
First, it is paternalistic in nature. In effect, the ethicist substitutes his or her own
values for those of the individuals involved in the transaction. For example,
May argues that "[t]he human body is... an organism with organs. I not only
have a body; I am my body. It is my means of self-presentation to the world,
and if, in response to some need, I act to contribute part of it, the appropriate
form should be giving, not selling."' 48 Every scholar argues that their view
should be accepted by others. If one accepts the basic concept of individual
liberty, then one must also adhere to the view that individuals should generally
be free to make and be held responsible for their own decisions. 49 Given this
view, a voluntary exchange by two parties cannot involve coercion of any kind,
economic or otherwise. 50
145. Harper's Forum, supra note 142, at 51.
146. Id.
147. One interpretation is that individuals value the ability to commit themselves against actions that
ex ante they prefer not to do, but ex post would find in their self interest. In other words, an individual
might gain from a ban on organ sales because ex post. he will be unable to resist the financial incentives
to sell his relative's organ whereas ex ante he would prefer that the organs be buried. As the text indicates,
we are not persuaded that this preference by some justifies a ban that applies to all.
148. See Harper's Forum, supra note 142, at 51.
149. Moreover, to the extent possible, one should be free from the dictates of those who seek to impose
their values upon others.
150. But see Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1988). Eisenberg
might argue that a contract to sell an organ, entered into because of the donor's economic distress, is
unconscionable and, therefore, should not be enforced on equitable grounds. But this does not resolve the
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We assume that individuals who accept compensation in exchange for the
organs of a recently deceased family member have weighed the benefits of such
compensation against the "costs", if any, of not burying these organs. If the
outcome of that decision process is to sell the organs, then it must be that these
individuals are made better off by their voluntary choice.' 5' Perhaps they may
be consoled by the fact that the decision to sell the organs will bring improved
health to the ultimate recipients of those organs. In any event, they will receive
reimbursement that may help with medical bills, funeral expenses, and the like.
Since most organ donors are relatively young accident victims, these expenses
are generally unexpected, and many families are unprepared for them. The
organ sales may permit the family to afford the sort of burial that they want,
allowing them to escape another form of ostensible economic coercion. 5 2
A second problem with the economic coercion argument is that it presumes
that the market-clearing price of cadaveric organs will be sufficiently high to
provide a financial incentive that overrides fundamental religious or moral
beliefs. Economic reasoning, however, suggests that the equilibrium price of
cadaveric organs is likely to be low in comparison to the prices at which living
donors have sold kidneys in other countries. 53 Although there is no reliable
way to predict free market prices in the absence of a free market, one author
estimates that cadaveric organs would probably sell for less than $5,000 each
under a market system. 54 Two sets of facts support this claim: First, at pres-
ent, we collect less than fifteen percent of the cadaveric organs that would be
suitable for transplantation.'55 Consequently, a tremendous increase in supply
is physically possible. Second, survey evidence suggests that many potential
donors fail to donate organs simply because they are never asked.'56 More-
over, this same evidence reveals neither strongly held widespread religious nor
moral opposition to the concept of organ donation. Therefore, by providing a
profit incentive for someone to request donation and by providing a (albeit
small) financial incentive to agree to donation, a market system could produce
issue of whether willing buyers and willing sellers should be precluded from entering such a contract. See
also Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L. & EcoN. 293 (1975).
151. See Hansmann, supra note 9, at 72-74 (examining protection of the poor and improvident as a
rationale for rejecting the market system). Hansmann appears to be unconvinced, as are we.
152. At the risk of introducing some serious complications by considering live donors, one may point
to the following circumstance. An Australian woman, who had lost her home to fire and had no insurance,
grew tired of the constant economic struggle to support herself and her children. She offered to sell one
of her kidneys for $20,000. Kidney Sales Spur Attempt in Britain to Ban the Practice, supra note 53, at
A5, col. 2. Forbidding this transaction is supposed to make her better off. But how would one explain that
to her? We would prefer not to attempt it.
153. We are relying upon our prior reasoning that suggests that the supply curve of organs may be
relatively flat.
154. Cohen, supra note 7, at 35. If this number were accurate, the total value of all cadaveric organs
would amount to some $30,000 - $35,000, which would be somewhat more financially attractive. But in
any case, for the reasons stated in Section ll.B., supra, we believe this to be an overestimate.
155. Denise, supra note 4, at 1020.
156. See Interchangeable Parts, supra note 24, at 61.
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a large supply of organs available at a relatively low price. This, in turn, means
that whatever "economic coercion" may be involved in this transaction will be
small, and any strongly held beliefs will simply lead to a refusal to sell.
Third, if we are going to base our selection of policy options on the sole
criterion of the degree of coercion involved, then we must look at the market
system not in isolation but in comparison to our existing system. A market
system would create a mechanism for voluntary exchanges at mutually agree-
able prices. Under the current system, a physician, nurse, or organ procurement
officer must try to coax the family of the deceased into giving away an asset
that is likely worth several thousand dollars for free. Which system involves
greater coercion? By favoring the current altruistic system over the market
system, the medical ethicist is merely substituting moral or emotional coercion
for the alleged "economic coercion" that would accompany a market sys-
tem.
157
Finally, those commentators who argue that the market system is economi-
cally coercive must take responsibility for the high price extracted under the
current policy to avoid such coercion. In effect, defenders of the present system
are trading lives for a policy that they personally prefer because of its reliance
upon altruism.
B. Transplant Accessibility for the Poor
It appears that a second major concern preventing the adoption of a market-
based system of organ procurement in the United States is access to transplants
by the poor.' At least one commentator feels that under a market system
of procurement only wealthy individuals will be able to afford transplants. 59
This concern is ill-founded. In order to clarify the likely effects of adopting a
market-based system of procurement on access to organ transplants by the poor,
three aspects of our preceding analysis need to be underscored.
The first point is that the accessibility concern is based largely upon an
implicit assumption that transplantable organs will be expensive under a market
system. This assumption confuses the current value with the market equilibrium
price. For example, in Figure 3, P, is confused with P3. The high value given
to organs under the current system is thought to carry over to the market
regime. If, as we have argued, the supply curve of transplantable organs is
157. Moreover, the current system fosters an undesirable atmosphere of emotional coercion within
families. For example, living related donors often feel that they can hardly refuse to donate an organ to a
close family member, despite their own fears and misgivings.
158. This raises the obvious question of whether the poor have access under the present system. With
the exception of kidneys, transplant operations are very expensive and generally unavailable to anyone of
average means without medical insurance. Interchangeable Parts, supra note 24, at 63.
159. Rinehart, The Market Approach to Organ Shortages, 8 J. HEALTH CARE MKTO. 72 (1988). But
see Cohen, supra note 7, at 28-29 (criticizing this concern).
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relatively elastic, then, the equilibrium market price will fall well below current
values. 10 Accordingly, the purchase price of organs will then be within the
reach of a much greater portion of the population than current values sug-
gest.16'
Second, under a market system, permitting prices to rise to equilibrium
levels is likely to result in a substantial increase in the number of cadaveric
organs made available for transplantation. The particular funding mechanism
utilized will determine whether or not this additional supply of organs becomes
available to the poor. Given that more organs are made available for transplan-
tation, adoption of a market system creates at least an opportunity to increase
the availability of this treatment to everyone. Thus, it is entirely possible to
design a policy that allocates the entire increase in the number of cadaveric
organs to the poor.
An analogy would be our public policy concerning access to food by the
poor. We do not stipulate that food prices be deemed zero because of the clear
disincentives presented to food producers under such a policy. Instead, we allow
market forces to establish food prices and then subsidize purchases by low
income individuals. 62 While the food stamp program is certainly not without
its flaws, it is, nonetheless, superior to a policy of free food for all who could
obtain it. Thus, those opposed to a market system on the ground that it would
place transplants out of the poor's reach have failed to appreciate the likely
effect that such a system would have on the total quantity supplied and the
capability of allocating that supply to the group considered to be at risk.
Finally, the accessibility argument ignores the beneficial cost effect that a
market-based system would offer the Federal End Stage Renal Disease program.
Adopting a market system could substantially reduce the expenditures of that
program through two major channels. First, transplantation is a less expensive
form of treatment for renal failure than dialysis. Aroesty and Rettig'63 esti-
mate cost savings to the Health Care Financing Administration of $47,000 to
$66,000 over a five-year period for each patient shifted from dialysis to trans-
160. Although we are not persuaded that Cohen's estimate of $5000 is much more than a guess, this
sum would amount to a small part of the total cost of a transplant operation, which is $32,000 for kidneys
and $267,000 for livers. Interchangeable Parts, supra note 24, at 63.
161. One can argue that the current system restricts access to transplants by the poor more than a
market system. The inflated value of transplantable organs, caused by the restricted quantity supplied, gives
rise to black market activities and other forms of abuse which only the rich can afford. Moreover, disequilib-
rium in the market also permits other undesirable consequences such as discrimination. Currently, there is
a concern that some racial discrimination in the allocation of available kidneys may exist. Blacks On List
Longer For Kidney Transplants, Gainesville Sun, Aug. 23, 1990, at 5A, col. 1.
162. This may be one reason that the government is not in favor of a market system. Once positive
prices are implemented, the government would b. hard pressed to refuse subsidies to those who would die
without a transplant. As a result, there may be a fear that the government will have to pay for the bulk of
the transplant organs. This, however, ignores the fact that there are many other items essential to the health
and welfare of society that continue to carry positive prices: medical care, clothing, shelter, and so on.
163. Aroesty & Rettig, supra note 21, at 27.
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plantation."6 Thus, in order to move additional patients from dialysis to trans-
plantation, the federal government may find it cost-effective to subsidize the
purchase price of kidneys. In doing so the resulting reduction in expenditures
could more than offset the costs of procurement. Kidney patients, taxpayers,
and organ suppliers would all benefit under such a policy.
Second, it is likely that the incentives provided by a market system of
procurement would reduce some of the current costs of acquiring organs. In
1980, the Health Care Financing Administration incurred expenditures of
approximately $7000 for each cadaveric kidney collected.'65 While much of
this cost is associated with the care and treatment required to collect a kidney
under any system, it also reflects the advertising and procurement efforts needed
to obtain these kidneys at a zero price. This portion of the current acquisition
cost may be substantially reduced by adopting a system of sales and purchases.
We may be spending an unnecessarily large sum on advertising in order to
convince people to give away something that they would have gladly sold at
a relatively low price. It would not seem reasonable, for example, to spend
$100 to persuade someone to donate something that they would have been
willing to sell for $50. Thus, the increase in total acquisition costs incurred as
a result of fully funding organ purchases under a market system is likely to be
less than the purchase price of the kidneys obtained. In fact, it is possible that
total acquisition costs would actually fall under a market system of procure-
ment.
Regardless of whether organ acquisition costs rise or fall, the total expendi-
tures of the End Stage Renal Disease program will drop, even if the purchase
price of kidneys is included under this program. Thus, subsidization of organ
purchases can be cost-effective. As a result, access to transplants by the poor
is likely to improve under this system. With kidney purchases subsidized, more
kidneys available, and government expenditures reduced, there are no apparent
losers under this policy.
C. Premature Termination of Care
The third ethical issue we address pertains to potential incentives for
premature termination of care. This problem involves a fear on the part of
164. These cost savings fail to consider the additional benefits of the more active and productive
lifestyles of transplant recipients relative to dialysis patients. The former are much more likely to be able
to continue full-time employment. See R. EVANS, CASE-MIX, TREATMENT MODALITIES AND PATIENT
OUTcOMES: RESULTS OF THE NATIONAL KIDNEY DIALYSIS AND KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION STUDY (1982).
165. Aroesty & Rettig, supra note 21, at 13.
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patients that an organ market might result in unwarranted removal of care.'66
For example, if a potential supplier has entered into a contract for delivery of
her organs at death, and due to the forces of supply and demand, the current
"spot" price of organs is high, then she may be apprehensive about the commit-
ment of the attending physician to sustain her life in the event that such a
decision must be made.
Two fundamental problems exist with this line of reasoning. The termination
of care concern is founded upon a belief that the equilibrium market price of
organs would be relatively high. As we explained above, that is unlikely to be
the case. If, as we suspect, the equilibrium price would be low relative to
current values, then the incentive to terminate care will be correspondingly
low. 167
A second problem with the termination argument is that, under a market
system, the attending physician has no motive for profit in obtaining the organs
from the patient. Under that system, the property rights to the organs of the
deceased would be held by the party that had entered into the contract for
delivery. That is, either the private procurement firm, the government procure-
ment agency, or the surviving family members are the only entities that might
directly benefit from the death of the contractor. The physician responsible for
the patient's care has no incentive to withhold treatment. 6 '
The issue of premature termination of care, then, is not a sound basis for
rejecting a market system of organ procurement. In fact, the problem is likely
to be worse under the current policy because of the relatively high value of
organs on the black market. The logical basis for the moral superiority of the
current system over the market system is far from obvious. The primary
difference between these two systems is the price of exchange. In the current
system, price is held fixed at zero. In the market system, it is allowed to rise
to equilibrium levels. Thus, under a market system, organ suppliers (or their
survivors) receive monetary compensation in exchange for forfeiting the right
to bury the body intact. Under the altruistic system, they receive no compensa-
tion.
166. Those who commit their organs upon death increase the present value to others of their demise.
Consequently, life support measures may be used less extensively on an individual who has promised to
supply his organs upon death. Forseeing this possibility, some people may be reluctant to will their organs.
See Dukeminier, supra note 7, at 865.
167. In fact, the incentive to engage in such behavior is greater under the current system of procurement
because of the artificial scarcity that is created. Under a system that produces an adequate supply at
comparatively low prices, there will be a much lower incentive to engage in this type of unethical behavior.
168. A third party might possibly bribe the physician to terminate care prematurely. This possibility
seems remote, however, because the market price is not apt to be very high relative to what the physician
stands to lose if he is discovered: loss of reputation, moral opprobrium, loss of income if his license is
revoked, criminal prosecution, and the like.
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D. Summary
The three ethical arguments that we have examined are not sufficient to
undermine the case for adopting a market system of cadaveric organ procure-
ment. On the contrary, our evaluation confirms the superiority of the market
system on ethical, as well as economic, grounds. As a result of the chronic
undersupply of transplantable organs that results under the altruistic system, an
additional and unnecessary loss of lives is caused by this procurement policy
option. It is questionable how a system that trades lives in exchange for-zero
monetary compensation to suppliers can be viewed as superior. That, however,
is precisely the tradeoff involved in choosing between these two alternative
organ procurement policies.
Conclusion
The question of alternative organ procurement policies is an extremely
important public policy issue. The choice that we make, whether by conscious
design or by default, will affect the health of tens of thousands of patients who
are waiting for kidneys, hearts, and livers. For many, the choice we make will
mean the difference between life and death. There is a glaring need for open
minds and rational debate on this issue.
At the same time, we recognize that this is an emotional issue.'69 It may
not be possible to examine alternative solutions in a completely cold and
analytical fashion. But emotional issues do not require illogical solutions. In
an effort to advance our understanding of the organ supply problem, we have
examined three alternative organ procurement policies: (1) the current altruistic
system, (2) a market-based system, and (3) a system based on reassignment of
property rights.
The most striking outcome of the altruistic system is that a shortage of
organs inevitably results from the straightforward operation of market forces.
This shortage appears to be wholly unnecessary. The reassignment of property
rights seems to be better, but the best system relies upon the market mecha-
nism. We have shown that the market system is superior to either of the
alternatives on overall social welfare grounds. 70 Moreover, the market system
was also shown to provide an opportunity for improved access to transplants
by the poor. Also, it was shown not to have adverse impact on incentives to
provide care to potential organ suppliers. Finally, it exhibits less coercion of
169. See, e.g., Manga, supra note 56, at 325 (noting that those who oppose "commodification" of
organs believe it to be "intrinsically objectionable," but characterizing this as "an emotionally charged
assertion and not a reasoned argument.").
170. See Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 970 (1985) (arguing that alienation
should be restrained only to control external harms or resolve common pool problems). Neither circumstance
is present when examining organ supply.
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organ donors than either of the alternative systems. Therefore, we conclude that
the ethical concerns with a market system of procurement are completely ill-
founded. 7'
Several groups benefit from the current policy: physicians, hospitals, health
insurance companies, and organ procurement and distribution employees; and
two groups lose: potential transplant recipients and organ donors. The former
groups are cohesive, well-organized, and politically influential. The latter groups
are diffuse, unorganized, and politically silent. The economic theory of regula-
tion predicts that the former groups will tend to dominate in the policy arena,
and they have.
We have been students of regulation, antitrust, and related microeconomic
policy issues for all of our adult lives. Yet we have never encountered a single
policy more at odds with public welfare than the current organ procurement
policy in the United States. Until the interested parties (physicians, hospitals,
patients, and policy makers) consider alternative organ procurement policies,
the existing shortage will persist. In fact, if the current policy is maintained the
shortage will continue to grow worse, as will the needless suffering.
171. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI AND P. BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (examining the agonizing
choices that society must make in allocating scarce resources that are a matter of life and death). But of
course we should avoid being forced to make such choices if at all possible. In the case of transplantable
organs, the market system can eliminate the shortage and reduce or eliminate the need for tragic choices.
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